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INTRODUCTION 
Many economists have analyzed the importance of asymmetric information in 
explaining labor market outcomes (Spence, 1973; Akerlof, 1976; Waldman, 1984; and 
Greenwald, 1986; among others).  In particular, Gibbons and Katz (1991) developed and 
tested a model of adverse selection in the labor market.  In their paper, they argue that, if 
employers have private information concerning employees’ productivity and if they have 
discretion over whom to lay off, then the market infers that laid-off workers have lower 
productive ability.  The authors argue that workers displaced because of plant closings, in 
contrast, do not suffer from such adverse inference because all workers lose their jobs when 
a plant closes.  They predict that earnings losses associated with layoffs should be larger 
than earnings losses associated with plant closings.  They confirm this prediction using the 
1984-1986 Displaced Workers Supplements to the Current Population Survey. 
In their theoretical model, Gibbons and Katz do not allow for workers returning to 
their former employers, even though many laid-off workers in the United States are 
rehired by their former employers.  Lilien (1980) uses data from the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) to show that about three-quarters of the workers laid off in 
manufacturing in the 1970s were rehired by their former employers.  Katz (1986) finds 
that this process is also widespread outside manufacturing.  Moreover, Anderson and 
Meyer (1994) calculate that 28 percent of turnover is temporary (defined as temporary 
layoffs plus recalls).  Finally, the Mass Layoff Statistics program, also sponsored by 
BLS, reports that 68 percent of employers reporting a layoff in the second quarter of 1998 
indicated that they anticipated some type of recall.  It also reports that among all 
establishments expecting a recall, most employers expected to recall more than one-half 
of the separated employees and to do so within six months. 
Many authors have studied the effect of the layoff-rehire process on unemployment 
duration in the United States (Katz, 1986; Katz and Meyer, 1990; Anderson, 1992).  This 
paper adds to this literature by analyzing theoretically and empirically whether asymmetric  
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information affects the behavior of both laid-off workers and prospective employers in the 
United States.  My theoretical model offers a new explanation for unemployment among 
laid-off workers:  I find that laid-off workers who are of high productivity may choose 
unemployment over a low-paying job as a means of signaling their productivity. Using 
the 1988-2000 Displaced Workers Supplements to the Current Population Survey, I offer 
quantitative empirical evidence consistent with this explanation.   
In addition to providing an empirical test on whether there is asymmetric 
information in the labor market, this paper uncovers a new empirical fact about laid-off 
workers: the relation between post-displacement earnings and unemployment duration for 
laid-off workers who take new jobs differs from that of observationally equivalent 
workers who were displaced because of a plant closing.   
The main idea behind this paper is that workers know their levels of productivity 
with their original employers, which are correlated with their probabilities of recall and 
with their productivity with a new employer.
1  Prospective employers may gain from 
using workers’ private information to select among job applicants who are 
observationally equivalent.  Thus, workers with favorable information wish to signal it to 
employers, and they do so by taking a costly action--unemployment--for which the 
expected benefit is positively correlated with their private information.  The separating 
equilibria of this model predict a positive relation between post-displacement earnings and 
unemployment duration for laid-off workers who find a job with a new employer.
 2 
                                                                 
1 An underlying assumption is that employers have discretion over whom to layoff and recall. 
2 For simplicity, the theoretical model does not consider all the well-known factors that lead to the well-
documented negative relationship between post-displacement earnings and unemployment duration.  
Adapting the model to incorporate the negative effect of unemployment on earnings would not change the 
model’s main prediction, namely that asymmetric information and the high rate of recall lead to a positive 
relationship between post-displacement earnings and duration of unemployment for laid-off workers who 
take new jobs, holding everything else constant.  Ma and Weiss (1993) have also developed a signaling 
model in which least-able workers choose low-skilled jobs and more-able ones choose unemployment.  
Their key assumption is that workers possess private information about their own abilities, which is 
correlated with employers’ evaluations.  Ma and Weiss do not examine the layoff-rehire process, and they 
do not empirically test their model.  
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The relation between post-displacement earnings and unemployment duration is 
determined by many factors: loss of human capital during unemployment, stigma, 
unobserved heterogeneity, and, as this paper finds, asymmetric information.  Only the last 
element, combined with the high recall rate in the United States, leads to a positive 
relation between post-displacement earnings and unemployment duration for laid-off 
workers who get a job with a new employer.  This predicted relationship provides a basis 
for testing the existence of asymmetric information in the labor market.  To control for all 
unobserved heterogeneity
 not correlated with being a laid-off worker and with having a 
positive probability of being recalled, I use workers displaced through plant closings.  I 
assume that these workers cannot be rehired by their former employers.  
Using the 1988-2000 Displaced Workers Supplement, I first replicate Gibbons 
and Katz’s results.  I then test my model’s empirical hypothesis and find that, after 
controlling for unobservable characteristics using (otherwise observationally equivalent) 
workers displaced through plant-closings, the post-displacement earnings of laid-off 
workers who find a job with a new employer increase with the length of their 
unemployment duration.  Examining the relationship between earnings changes (instead 
of post-displacement earnings) and unemployment duration also gives a result consistent 
with the theoretical model’s empirical hypothesis.  Finally, I find that, as predicted by the 
model, laid-off workers have longer expected unemployment duration than  (otherwise 
observationally equivalent) workers displaced through plant closings.  
Because a search model may generate empirical predictions similar to those of the 
asymmetric-information model, I develop additional tests to explore which theoretical 
framework better explains the empirical findings.  Since blue-collar jobs are often 
covered by collective-bargaining agreements involving explicit layoff- and recall-by-
seniority rules, the information content of a layoff and a recall is not necessarily 
informative of the worker’s productivity.  Therefore, the asymmetric-information model 
would predict a stronger positive relationship between post-displacement earnings and  
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unemployment duration among workers laid off from white-collar jobs than among 
workers laid off from blue-collar jobs.  However, a search model would predict the 
opposite result because workers displaced from white-collar jobs are less likely to expect 
recall than are those displaced from blue-collar jobs.
3  In my sample, I find that, after 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the post-displacement earnings of laid-off 
workers displaced from white-collar jobs increase with the length of unemployment.  No 
such effect is apparent for blue-collar workers.   
The theoretical model is based upon the premise that laid-off workers with low 
recall expectations find new jobs faster than laid-off workers who expect to be recalled 
but take new jobs.  Katz and Meyer (1990) find evidence supporting this claim.  Using a 
sample of workers whose recall expectations have been identified, Katz and Meyer find, 
after controlling for observable characteristics, that laid-off workers who expect to be 
recalled but take new jobs tend to have much longer unemployment spells than 
observationally equivalent workers who did not expect to be recalled at the time of layoff 
(page 994, and table VI).  Similarly, Anderson (1992) using a different sample of workers 
whose recall expectations have also been identified finds that those workers who expect 
to be recalled have significantly lower new-job hazard rates than observationally 
equivalent workers who do not expect to be recalled.   
This paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents the theoretical model, 
which may be of independent interest.  Section three discusses the empirical implementation 
and provides empirical results.  Section four summarizes and interprets the findings of this 
paper. 
                                                                 
3 For a search model to predict a differential relationship between unemployment duration and post-
displacement wages for laid-off workers and workers displaced through plant closing, one needs to assume 
that laid-off workers’ subjective recall expectations decline over time.  As the subjective recall expectations 
decline over time, the reservation wage of laid-off workers falls and higher average quality laid-off workers 
(relative to workers displaced due to plant closings) start accepting new job offers.    
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THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
I.  The Model 
This is a two-period model in which initially all workers are laid off.  There are 
two types of laid-off workers: G-type workers and B-type workers. G-type workers were 
of high productivity with the original employer, and B-type workers were of low 
productivity with the original employer.    I assume that there is a continuum of workers of 
each type, t, where t = G or B.  The cumulative distribution of all workers is normalized to 
“1.”  The proportion of G-type workers is a (the proportion of B-type workers is 1-a), 
where 0<a<1.  Although I do not model the layoff decision, I presume that adverse 
selection operates here.  Thus, the fraction of B-type workers among layoffs may well 
exceed the fraction in the population as a whole, as in Gibbons and Katz (1991). 
Both the worker and the original employer know the worker’s type with that 
particular employer, where t = B or G.  However, laid-off workers are assumed to look 
identical to other potential employers.  G-type workers are more likely than B-type workers 
to be of high productivity with a new employer.  Specifically, a type-t worker will remain 
the same type of worker with a new employer with probability pt, where t = B or G and 
0<pB<pG<1.  Viewed alternatively, some workers are better than others, but even good 
workers perform badly on some jobs and bad workers perform well on others.  The 
productivity of a G-type worker is H and that of a B-type worker is L.  I assume that 
0<L<H.  After the worker remains with an employer for one period, his or her 
productivity with that particular employer is revealed to both the worker and the 
employer but not to the other firms.  
At the beginning of period one, workers are laid off and enter the labor market.  
Prospective employers observe that these workers have been laid off and simultaneously 
offer them a first-period wage.  Workers then choose either to work for a new employer--
accepting the highest wage offered (randomizing in case of a tie)--or to become 
unemployed.  An unemployed worker has a current income of zero.    At the beginning of  
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period two, the original employer recalls those former workers who are still unemployed 
with the probability of rt, t = B, or G.  My assumption that rB<rG£1 guarantees that the 
employer is more likely to recall high-productivity workers than low-productivity workers.  
For simplicity, I set rB=0, (that is, the employer does not recall those workers who are of 
low productivity at his firm).  Prospective employers observe that some unemployed 
workers are not recalled, and they simultaneously offer these workers a wage. Unemployed 
workers accept the highest wage offered (randomizing in case of a tie).  
  Workers work over the course of period two and retire at its end.   
For notational simplicity, I assume that there is no discounting between periods.  
Workers are expected-lifetime-income maximizers.  A large finite number of employers 
exist, and they maximize the present value of earnings.  Therefore, each period employers 
offer a wage equal to workers’ expected productivity.  Workers and firms are risk-neutral, 
and they know the population parameters: a, rt, pt, H, and L.  Because I assumed that rB=0, 
then rG=r.  I assume that once a worker accepts a job offer, he is precluded from receiving a 
future offer from a new employer.  This assumption greatly simplifies the model without 
modifying the main result.  Similarly, after accepting an offer, workers cannot quit to return 
to a former employer.
4  This assumption is consistent with the behavior of laid-off workers 
in the United States.  As mentioned earlier, many authors have found empirical evidence 
consistent with the fact that laid-off workers who expect to be recall choose to wait 
unemployed (Katz, 1986; Katz and Meyer, 1990; Anderson, 1992).
 
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium in this model is a strategy combination of workers 
and firms and a belief structure of firms such that a worker cannot increase his total 
expected lifetime earnings by changing his first-period choice of being unemployed or 
taking a first-period job given the wage schedules being offered, and a firm cannot increase 
                                                                 
4This assumption could be endogenized into the model.  For instance, I could assume that the employer 
bears a cost of hiring someone that may be recalled.  The market would then offer an even lower wage to 
laid-off workers, and those laid-off workers who think that they will be recalled would have a higher 
incentive to wait unemployed.    
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its expected profit by offering a different contingency wage schedule given workers’ 
strategies and its beliefs.  All proofs are in the appendix. 
 
II.  The Fully Separating Equilibrium 
The first theorem characterizes all equilibria in which some or all workers choose 
unemployment in the first period. 
 
Theorem 1.  The necessary condition for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which some 
workers choose to wait unemployed is  
   
L H
L
pB -
‡ - ) 1 (   (1) 
 
H and L are, respectively, the maximum and minimum wages that firms would offer to 
workers who are one period unemployed. L is also the minimum loss incurred by a 
worker who refuses a first period job.  Thus, when (1) does not hold, the minimum cost 
of signaling by choosing unemployment exceeds the maximum potential expected gain. 
 
To establish sufficiency, in lemmas 1-3, I characterize three classes of 
unemployment equilibrium; one, and only one, of these exists when (1) holds.  These 
perfect Bayesian equilibria are: (a) all G-type workers reject the first period wage, and all 
B-type workers take the first-period job (Lemma 1); (b) all G-type workers and some B-
type workers choose unemployment (Lemma 2); and (c) all laid-off workers choose 
unemployment (Lemma 3).  These are, respectively, fully-separating, semi-separating, 
and pooling equilibria.  For brevity, I examine below only the conditions under which 
Lemma 1 holds.  The characterization of Lemmas 2 and 3 can be found in the appendix.  
Given the above assumptions, these are the only possible equilibria with unemployment.   
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That is, for B-type workers to choose unemployment while G-type workers choose low-
paying jobs is never an equilibrium.   
 
Lemma 1.  For parameter values such that: 
   
L H
L
p p r B G -
‡ - - ) 1 (   (2) 
and    
L H
L
p p B G -
< -2   (3) 
 
the unique, perfect Bayesian equilibrium that survives the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion is 
one in which all G-type workers reject the first-period offer and all B -type workers 
accept it. 
 
When conditions (2) and (3) hold, the minimum cost of signaling by choosing 
unemployment is smaller than the maximum potential gain of G-type workers, but greater 
than the maximum potential gain of B-type workers.  Because of informational 
asymmetries and the existence of recalls among laid-off workers, accepting a job right 
away is sufficiently damaging to the future employment prospects of a laid-off worker 
that he may choose unemployment even if there is no disutility from work.  Since  
G-type workers have higher productivity with their former employers and are more likely 
to be recalled than B-type workers, they have greater incentives to signal their 
productivity through unemployment.  When conditions (2) and (3) hold, all G-type 
workers choose to reject the first-period market offer, whereas all B-type workers accept 
it.  
In this model, the equilibrium with no voluntary unemployment is also possible 
and is described in the appendix.  However, under certain conditions, this equilibrium 
fails to satisfy the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion. The intuitive criterion in this model is as  
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follows:  Starting from an equilibrium with no voluntary unemployment, a worker 
choosing to wait unemployed is implicitly making the following statement: “I must have 
a positive probability of being recalled because those workers with no probability of 
being recalled would not choose unemployment, even if employers believed that only the 
high-productivity laid-off workers choose unemployment.”   
  In the appendix, I show that the outcome equilibrium that satisfies the intuitive 
criterion is unique and must be one with voluntary unemployment.  In the separating 
equilibria--the fully (lemma1) and the semi-separating (lemma 2) equilibria--the post-
displacement earnings of permanently laid-off workers who accept jobs at the end of 
period one are lower than those of observationally equivalent permanently laid-off 
workers who are unemployed during the first period.
5  The next section presents the 
empirical implementation of this prediction and tests the theoretical model using the 
Displaced Workers Supplement to Current Population Survey. 
 
EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
In the signaling model described above, high-productivity laid-off workers are 
more likely to be recalled by their former employer than low-productivity laid-off 
workers.  Thus, they may choose to remain unemployed rather than to accept a low-wage 
job.  If so, unemployment can serve as a signal of productivity.  In this case, 
unemployment duration may be positively related to post-displacement earnings even 
among laid-off workers who are not recalled. 
  However, in the real world, the relation between earnings of displaced workers 
and unemployment duration is determined by many factors.  Among them are unobserved 
heterogeneity, loss of human capital, stigma, and, as I point out in this paper, asymmetric 
                                                                 
5 It is unclear whether this prediction would hold when all workers choose unemployment (lemma 3) 
because accepting a first-period job is an out-of-equilibrium strategy.  However, an equilibrium in which all 
laid-off workers choose unemployment is quite unlikely in the United States.  For example, in the DWS  
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information.  Most of these factors imply a negative relation between post-displacement 
earnings and length of unemployment.  For simplicity, the theoretical model does not 
consider all of the above-mentioned factors that lead to the well-documented negative 
relationship between post-displacement earnings and unemployment duration.  Adapting 
the model to incorporate the negative effect of unemployment on earnings would not 
change the model’s main prediction, namely that asymmetric information and the high 
rate of recall lead to a positive relationship between post-displacement earnings and 
duration of unemployment for laid-off workers, holding everything else constant.  
  To isolate the effects of asymmetric information in the U.S. labor market, I must 
control for all other factors affecting earnings and the duration of unemployment not 
associated with having a positive probability of recall.  To do so, I use workers displaced 
through plant closings.  I assume that workers displaced when the plant closes cannot be 
recalled, an assumption that, in this model, implies that they have no incentive to signal 
their productivity through unemployment.  Thus, this model does not imply a positive 
relationship between unemployment duration and post-displacement earnings for workers 
displaced because of plant closings.
6 
  My empirical hypothesis is that, after I control for unobserved heterogeneity by 
using (otherwise observationally equivalent) workers who were displaced through plant 
closings, the post-displacement earnings of laid-off workers who take new jobs right 
away should be lower than those of laid-off workers who remain longer unemployed.  I 
will test this hypothesis using data from January 1988, 1990, and 1992, and February 
1996, 1998, and 2000 from the Displaced Workers Supplement (DWS) to the Current 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
sample of laid-off workers used in the next section, more than 10 percent of laid-off workers find jobs 
without an intervening unemployment spell. 
6 In this paper, workers displaced through plant closings would always accept the first-period job in 
equilibrium.  Thus, to generate some unemployment among workers displaced through plant closings, some 
frictional unemployment is needed.  Adding frictional unemployment for both laid-off workers and workers 
displaced through plant closings into this model does not alter the results of this paper.  
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Population Survey (CPS).
7  I will also test this hypothesis against alternative hypotheses, 
in particular those implied by a standard search model. 
The theoretical model presented assumes that some laid-off workers have a 
positive probability of recall in the second period.  As the probability of recall converges 
toward zero, the expected benefits from waiting unemployed fall, decreasing the 
incentives to signal.  In the United States, most recalls take place within six months. For 
instance, Katz and Meyer (1990) find that the recall hazard becomes quite low after about 
twenty-five weeks of unemployment.  Similarly, Katz (1986) finds that almost no recalls 
occur after twenty-six weeks.  Thus, any signaling that may occur among laid-off 
workers in the U.S. labor market should be observed mainly within the time that 
prospective employers are most likely to infer that workers are waiting for recall, namely 
within the first couple of months of displacement.   
Finally, this model also predicts that, laid-off workers who are not recalled should 
have longer unemployment duration than that of (observationally equivalent) workers 
displaced through plant closings.  The reasoning behind this prediction is that by waiting, 
unemployed laid-off workers send a positive signal about their productivity to 
prospective employers.  Such positive inference associated with their longer 
unemployment duration does not take place when the cause of displacement is plant 
closing.  
 
I.  Data Description 
I examined a pooled sample of male workers between the ages of 20 and 61 who 
were permanently displaced from a private-sector, full-time, non-agricultural, and non-
                                                                 
7 I do not use the survey years 1984 and 1986 because they did not contain the variable “initial 
unemployment spell.”  For the 1986 supplement, I can obtain this variable for the subsample of workers 
who have had only one job since displacement.  For consistency purposes, I did not include this subsample 
in this paper, but the results are similar if the 1986 subsample is included.  I was unable to use the 1994 
supplement because there was an error in the supplement that year and the “initial unemployment spell” 
variable was not collected for all displaced workers who were re-employed at the survey date.  
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construction job because of a plant closing, slack work, or abolishment of a position or 
shift.
 8  I used permanently displaced workers in an attempt to identify a sample of 
workers who did not return to their previous jobs (and similar wages).
9  Like Gibbons and 
Katz (1991), I classified as laid-off workers those displaced because of slack work or a 
position or shift that was eliminated.
10   
I also excluded those workers who reported being a member of a union in their 
former job because most of union firms have layoff- and recall-by-seniority rules.
11   The 
information content of a layoff and of a recall depends on whether the employer has any 
discretion with respect to whom to lay off and recall.  In the presence of a layoff- and 
recall-by-seniority rule, for example, there may be little or no information concerning a 
workers’ productivity revealed by the fact that the worker was laid or recalled by layoff-
by-seniority rules.
12    
The sample is restricted to those individuals who were re-employed in wage-and-
salary employment at the survey date, who were no more than 36 weeks unemployed, and 
                                                                 
8 I did not include agricultural workers because they tend to have a large number of jobs with a pronounced 
seasonal pattern.  Workers displaced from construction jobs were eliminated from the sample because 
formulating an appropriate definition of permanent displacement from a construction job is difficult.  Like 
Gibbons and Katz, I focus on males displaced from full-time jobs in an attempt to identify a sample of 
workers with strong attachments to the labor force.  Moreover, the information content that prospective 
employers infer from observing female workers’ employment movements is considerably more complex 
than that of male workers.  For instance, the U.S. society understands that women may want to leave the 
labor force while they have small children.  However, such a choice is not as well understood when taken 
by a man. 
9 Katz and Meyer (1990) find that the post-displacement hourly earnings of workers with unemployment 
spells ending in recall are similar to their pre-displacement hourly earnings. 
10 If a worker lost more than one job, the survey questions refer to the lost job he had held the longest. 
11 Unfortunately, prior to the 1994 Supplement, the DWS did not provide information on whether a worker 
was a member of a union in his predisplacement job.  In the next section, I will address this by classifying 
displaced workers by whether they were displaced from industries with high- or low-rates of unionization. 
12 Abraham and Medoff (1984), for instance, find that (1) 92% of union firms have written rules to deal 
with permanent layoffs while only 24% of nonunion firms have such written layoff policies, and that (2) 
58% of nonunion firms have a practice of sometimes laying off a more senior worker if a junior is believed 
to be worth more on net, as compared to 17% of union employers.  
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who had re-employment earnings of at least $40 a week.
13  Later, I address the potential 
sample biases that may arise from using the DWS and from the fact that I exclude from 
the sample the workers who were not re-employed at the survey date. 
A major change in the DWS was a change in the recall period for which 
information on job loss was collected.  Prior to 1994, the DWS asked workers if they had 
lost a job in the last five years.  Starting in 1994, the DWS asked workers if they had lost 
a job in the last three years.  For consistency purposes, I only used workers who had 
reported losing a job in the last three years in the 1988, 1990 and 1992 DWS, but the 
results presented below are robust to including workers who reported losing a job in the 
last five years. 
The restriction that data on all required variables be available leaves a sample of 
2,040 workers displaced through plant closings and 2,410 laid-off workers who do not 
return to the former employer. Basic descriptive statistics for my sample of permanently 
displaced workers are presented in table 1.  More detailed descriptive statistics by length 
of displacement can be found in appendix tables 1-4.  Workers displaced through plant 
closings have, on average, significantly longer pre-displacement tenure (1.41 more years) 
than laid-off workers have.  This finding suggests that seniority rules may be important in 
the layoff decision.  Furthermore, workers displaced through plant closings have, on 
average, a significantly higher probability of finding a new job without an intervening 
unemployment spell (22.06 percent do not suffer unemployment compared with only 
15.39 percent of the sample of workers displaced through layoffs) and shorter initial 
spells of unemployment (1.27 fewer weeks) than workers displaced by layoffs.  Because 
unemployment duration usually increases with pre-displacement tenure, the fact that laid-
off workers have longer unemployment spells than those of workers displaced through 
                                                                 
13 I focus on workers who were displaced up to nine months to allow for some extra search time after the 
first six months of displacement.  The results shown below are robust to using samples of workers 
displaced for up to a year.  92 percent of all displaced workers in my sample had unemployment spells of  
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plant-closings, despite their shorter tenure, suggests that their incentive to wait 
unemployed may be greater than that of workers displaced through plant closings.  In 
addition, compared with laid-off workers, workers displaced through plant closings are 
more experienced, and less educated, a larger percentage of them receive advance notice, 
and a smaller percentage of them are in white-collar jobs.  Finally, workers displaced 
through plant closings are more likely to be married and less likely to be white. 
Table 1 also provides information on the post-displacement earnings relative to 
the pre-displacement earnings.  The earnings loss for the typical displaced worker is 
substantial: Being displaced reduces the earnings of the “average” worker by $62.80 per 
week (or $3,516.80 per year).
14  I find that the mean loss in the log of real weekly 
earnings for workers displaced through layoffs (-.133) is significantly greater than that 
experienced by workers displaced through plant closings (-.106).  Since much evidence 
indicates that the earnings losses of displaced workers rise substantially with pre-
displacement tenure (Podgursky and Swaim, 1987; Kletzer, 1989; and Topel, 1991), the 
fact that workers displaced through plant closings have smaller earnings losses than 
workers displaced through layoffs, despite their higher average pre-displacement tenure, 
suggests that a “lemons effect” may be operating.   
Similar results hold when one classifies workers by length of displacement (tables 
1-4 in the appendix).  The mean loss in the log of real weekly earnings for the “average” 
worker increases with unemployment duration.  Comparing layoff to plant closings, I find 
that the mean loss in the log of real weekly earnings for laid-off workers with less than 
one month of unemployment is greater than that for similar workers displaced through 
plant closings.  However, this finding is reversed for workers who are unemployed from 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
36 weeks or less, and 98 percent of all displaced workers in my sample had unemployment spells of one 
year or less. 
14 The average pre-displacement deflated weekly earnings for the sample are $618.13. The measure of pre-
displacement wages is the usual weekly earnings before deductions that the worker earned at his job before 
he became displaced.  The measure of post-displacement wages is the usual weekly earnings at his current 
job (that is, the job he holds at survey date.)    
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five to twelve weeks, suggesting that there may be a positive effect of some 
unemployment for laid-off workers versus workers displaced through plant closings.   
 
II.  Earnings Equation 
II.1.  Previous results 
Table 2 replicates Gibbons and Katz’s results and shows that workers displaced 
through layoffs experience 3.7 percent greater wage losses than workers displaced 
through plant closings.
15 Like them, I find that the greater wage loss is explained by 
lower post-displacement earnings and by higher pre-displacement earnings.  Thus, as in 
Gibbons and Katz, a “lemons effect” seems to be associated with being displaced through 
a layoff relative to being displaced through plant closings.   
 
II.2.  Specification 
The theoretical model predicts that, after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
by using observationally equivalent workers who were displaced through plant closings, 
the post-displacement earnings of laid-off workers who take new jobs right away should 
be lower than those of laid-off workers who remain longer unemployed.  I can test the 
these predictions by estimating the following equation: 
i i i i i i i i X Z Z D D L Y x d b b a a b g + + + + + + + = '
2
3 2
2
3 2 1
 
(4) 
where: Yi is the log real post-displacement weekly earnings for worker i for   i=1,...N;   
Li
  is a dummy for cause of displacement (Li
  = 1 if the worker is laid off, and 0 if 
the worker is displaced through plant closings);   
Di is the length of unemployment between the time the worker was displaced and 
the time he found his first job;   
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
15 Using January 1984 and 1986 DWS, Gibbons and Katz (1991) find that workers displaced through 
layoffs experience 4 percent greater wage losses than workers displaced through plant closings.   
 
 
18 
 
 
 
  Di
2 is the square of the length of unemployment;   
Zi is the interaction between the layoff dummy and the length of unemployment 
variable;   
Zi
2is the interaction between the layoff dummy and the square of the length of 
unemployment;  and  
  Xi  is a vector of observable pre-displacement characteristics.
16   
  I assume that prospective employers know the workers’ employment history.  
Besides controlling for workers’ observable characteristics, in particular the log real pre-
displacement weekly earnings, I also control for workers’ pre-displacement industry and 
occupation, region of displacement, year of displacement, and year of survey.  These 
variables aim to control for macroeconomic and regional effects.  All regressions use the 
Huber/White estimator of variance. 
  Alternatively, I have examined a similar equation in which the LHS variable is the 
change in earnings before and after displacement.  The results from this specification are 
consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model and can be found in the tables 10-
14 of the appendix.
 17   
                                                                 
16  The covariates are: the covariates are: log (previous earnings deflated by GDP deflator); a spline 
function in previous tenure (with breaks at 1, 2, 3, and 6 years); eleven dummies for completed education 
(one for “one to four years”; one for “five to six years”; one for “seven to eight years”; one for “nine 
years”; one for “ten years”; one for “eleven years”; one for “twelve years”; one for “thirteen years”; one for 
“fourteen and fifteen years”; one for “sixteen years”; one for “seventeen years”); fourteen “year-of-
displacement” dummies; five “year of survey” dummies; one “years since displacement” dummy; one 
“advance notification” dummy; ten “previous-industry” dummies; five “previous-occupation” dummies; 
one “experience at displacement” variable and its square; one “pre-displacement marital status” dummy; 
one “non-white” dummy; one “survey pre-1994” dummy; three “region” dummies; and “state” dummies.   
17 As explained in the theory section, an extended version of this model, with both endogenous layoff and 
rehire processes, yields the following prediction:  “Relative to observationally equivalent workers displaced 
through plant closings, the earnings losses of laid-off workers decrease as their unemployment spell 
lengthens.”  This result occurs because, following Gibbons and Katz, competition among employers and 
symmetric but imperfect information about workers’ productivity the first time workers enter the market 
yield a single pre-displacement wage,
 independent of workers’ type and the cause of displacement.  The 
prediction regarding the post-displacement earnings is identical to that presented in this paper.   
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II.3.  Main Model 
  Column 1 of Table 3 displays the results from equation (4).  After controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity not correlated with having a positive probability of recall, I 
find that the post-displacement earnings of laid-off workers increase with the length of 
unemployment.  Laid-off workers with no unemployment spell experience 3.6 percent 
lower post-displacement earnings than observationally equivalent workers displaced 
through plant closings (this finding is consistent with Gibbons and Katz “lemons” effect).  
However, this differential decreases and becomes positive as the length of unemployment 
increases, consistent with the asymmetric information model presented in this paper. 
After being unemployed for four weeks, laid-off workers’ post-displacement earnings are 
similar to those of workers displaced through plant closings; after four months of 
unemployment, laid-off workers’ post-displacement earnings are 2 percent higher than 
those of workers displaced through plant closings.  These effects might understate the 
true signaling effect of unemployment for the following two reasons.  First, some laid-off 
workers included in the sample could end up returning to their original employer and thus 
they should have higher re-employment wages and shorter initial spells of joblessness 
than workers who do not return to the original employers.
18  Second, many of the layoffs 
in the sample are likely to be determined by strict seniority systems.
19 
  The results in column 1 also show that displaced workers experience increasing 
losses in earnings as their unemployment spell lengthens—although the earnings loss is 
considerably larger for workers displaced through plant closings (an additional week of 
                                                                 
18 The DWS is known to overstate what would be considered job displacement because some laid-off 
workers end up returning to their original employer after the survey date.  This occurs despite the fact that 
workers entering my sample are re-employed at survey date and have answered “yes” to the question:  “In 
the past 3 years, have you left or lost a job because of a plant closing, an employer going out of business, or 
a layoff from which you were not recalled, or other similar reasons?”  
19 I tried to minimize this concern by excluding those workers who reported being displaced from unionized 
jobs.  However, prior to the 1994 Supplement, the DWS did not identify workers displaced from unionized 
jobs.  Below, I address this concern.  
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unemployment lowers their weekly earnings at a new job by 1.5 percent, as shown in 
column 2 of Table 3) than for laid off workers (an additional week of unemployment 
lowers their weekly earnings at a new job by less than 0.7 percent, as shown in column 3 
of Table 3).  As mentioned earlier, others have found that workers who are unemployed 
longer (especially those exhausting unemployment insurance benefits) tend to have larger 
wage losses than short-term unemployed workers.  Loss of human capital, stigma 
associated with being unemployed, or decreases in the workers’ reservation wage are 
some of the arguments put forth to explain this negative relationship between 
unemployment duration and earnings of displaced workers.  As I pointed out earlier, my 
theoretical work is not contrary to these arguments.  It focuses instead on the effects of 
asymmetric information and the high probability of recall on post-displacement earnings. 
 
II.4.  Testing the Asymmetric Information Model versus the Search Model 
While the results so far are consistent with the asymmetric information model, 
they cannot distinguish between my model and a standard search model combined with a 
“lemons” effect among laid-off workers at displacement.  Thus, to test this model further 
I distinguish between white- and blue-collar workers.   
A search model could explain the differential search activity between workers 
displaced through layoffs and those displaced through plant closings through their 
different recall expectations.  Since laid-off workers have higher recall expectations than 
those displaced through plant closings, their reservation wage would be higher allowing 
them to search longer for a good job.  As the unemployment spell increased, the recall 
expectations would fade, generating a steeper post-displacement earnings profile for laid-
off workers than for similar workers displaced through plant-closings, and thus leading to 
a differential earnings pattern similar to that of the one observed in the asymmetric-
information model.  Because workers laid-off from blue-collar jobs are more likely to 
expect recall than those laid off from white-collar jobs (Katz and Meyer, 1990), the  
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search model would then predict a stronger positive relationship between post-
displacement earnings and duration of unemployment among workers laid-off from blue-
collar jobs than among those laid off from white-collar jobs. 
In the asymmetric information model, recall expectations are important due to 
their information content.  Workers know their levels of productivity with their former 
employers, which are correlated with their probabilities of recall and with their 
productivity with a new employer.  Those workers with favorable information are more 
likely to expect to be recalled and more willing to take a costly action—unemployment.  
Because many fewer white- than blue-collar jobs are covered by collective-bargaining 
agreements involving explicit layoff- and recall-by-seniority rules, the degree of 
discretion over whom to lay off and recall is likely to be higher in white- than blue-collar 
jobs, and thus, the information content of a layoff and a recall is considerably higher in 
white- than blue-collar jobs.  Therefore, the asymmetric information model would predict 
a stronger positive relationship between post-displacement earnings and duration of 
unemployment among workers laid-off from white-collar jobs than among those laid off 
from blue-collar jobs.  Columns 1 and 2 of table 4 display separate estimates for the two 
groups.
20  I find that, after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity by using (otherwise 
observationally equivalent) workers who were displaced through plant closings, the post-
displacement earnings of laid-off workers displaced from white-collar jobs increase with 
the unemployment spell.  No such effect is apparent for blue-collar workers.  This 
evidence supports the asymmetric-information model. 
  An alternative approach is to classify workers by the likelihood that they were 
displaced from industries with low- and high-unionization rates.  The idea being that the 
information content of a recall should be smaller in those industries with higher 
unionization rates than in those with lower unionization rates because layoff- and recall-
by seniority rules are more common in high-unionization rate industries.  Columns 3 and 4 
                                                                 
20 Descriptive statistics of these and other subgroups analyzed in the paper can be found in the Appendix.    
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of Table 4 show the estimates for workers displaced from industries with low- and high-
unionization rates, respectively.
21   I find that, relative to observationally equivalent 
workers displaced through plant-closings, the post-displacement earnings of laid-off 
workers displaced from industries with low-unionization rates increase with the length of 
unemployment.  No such effect is apparent for workers in high-unionized industries.  
Again, these findings are consistent with the asymmetric-information model. 
  Similarly, one may also be concerned that the results found in column 1 of Table 
3 may be driven by differences in the composition of the pool of laid-off workers and that 
of workers displaced through plant closings.  For example, much evidence suggests that 
advance notice yields a productive pre-displacement search (Addison and Blackburn, 
1995; Swaim and Podgursky, 1990).  If so, one may be concerned that a pre-displacement 
search among laid-off workers may be affecting the above results.  Moreover, notified 
workers may differ from their non-notified counterparts in some unmeasured way (Ruhm, 
1992). In such a case, one would want to distinguish between those workers who were 
notified in advance and those who were not.  With a sample of workers who do not 
receive advance notice, the theory predicts that, after one controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity with workers displaced through plant closing, the post-displacement 
earnings of laid-off workers should increase with their length of unemployment.  Yet the 
predictions of the asymmetric-information model are not so straightforward when 
workers receive advance notice.  Assuming that (1) productive pre-displacement search 
occurs among workers who receive advance notice, (2) prospective employers observe 
the pre-displacement search time, and (3) the longer the pre-displacement notice the more 
productive the worker’s search, the model would predict that, after controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity using workers displaced through plant closings, laid-off 
workers’ post-displacement earnings increase with the workers’ total search time (instead 
                                                                 
21 For a given year of displacement, I define industries with high-unionization rates as those having a 
unionization rate above the sample mean rate for that year.    
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of with the duration of unemployment).  Unfortunately, Addison and Blackburn’s results 
(1995) provide no evidence of monotonically increasing benefits from longer pre-
displacement written notice.  Moreover, they do not find evidence of any incremental 
value to receiving extended written notice rather than informal notice.  Thus, the 
asymmetric-information model would not necessarily predict a positive relationship 
between post-displacement earnings and the length of unemployment among laid-off 
workers.  Column 1 of Table 5 displays the estimates for workers who, in my sample, did 
not receive advance notice.  These results are consistent with the theoretical model: 
Relative to observationally equivalent workers displaced through plant closings, laid-off 
workers’ post-displacement earnings increase with the length of unemployment. As 
shown in column 2 of Table 5, this pattern is not observed among workers who receive 
advance notice of displacement.  As mentioned earlier, this unobserved pattern may result 
from complex reasons.  Despite its interest, the topic lies beyond the scope of the present 
paper.   
  Finally, because the search behavior of unemployment-insurance (UI) recipients 
may differ from that of nonrecipients, or because UI recipients may differ from their 
nonrecipients counterparts in some unmeasured way, I distinguish between those workers 
who received UI benefits and those who did not.  Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 display the 
results for the two samples.  In both samples, after controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity with observationally equivalent workers displaced through plant closings, 
laid-off workers who are unemployed longer receive higher post-displacement earnings. 
    
III.  Sensitivity Analysis   
III.1.  Robustness  
  The results above are robust to model specifications, to changes in the definition 
of the sample, and to various changes of the covariates.  As mentioned earlier, these  
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results are also consistent to using the change in earnings before and after displacement 
as the LHS variables.
22  
 
III.2. Retrospection bias 
  The CPS supplements are retrospective in as much as respondents are asked to 
describe events that may have occurred up to three years in the past.
23  This characteristic 
is a problem when the errors are not random, such as if a worker recalls only an 
especially traumatic or costly displacement that occurred four to five years previously.  A 
priori, it is not clear whether this bias is worse for plant closings than for layoffs.  
Looking at the raw data, I find that, for a given year, many more layoffs are reported in 
the earlier survey than in the later one.  The analogous comparison of plant closings 
reported reveals a much smaller difference that is even reversed during the late 1980s.  
Yet, looking at the averages of tenure seems to indicate that particularly traumatic layoffs 
are more likely to be remembered, which would downward bias the true signaling effect 
of unemployment (Appendix Tables 21 and 22).  To analyze the dimension of this 
problem, I re-estimate equation (4) dropping the earliest year from each DWS.  The 
results are shown in Appendix Table 23 and show evidence of this downward bias. 
 
III.3.  Sample selection bias 
  The regressions above are based on a sample of displaced workers who were re-
employed at the survey date, and therefore, the estimates may reflect sample-selection 
bias because some of the workers have had little time to find a new good job match.  To 
                                                                 
22 The results shown in tables 3 through 5 are robust to alternative functional forms of the unemployment-
spell variable, the inclusion of interactions between the log real pre-displacement weekly earnings and the 
length-of-unemployment-spell variables, and interactions between tenure and the length-of-unemployment-
spell variables.  The results were also robust to the inclusion of workers with longer spell of initial 
unemployment, part-time workers, workers earning less than $40 a week, and public-sector workers. I also 
re-run the regressions dropping outliers.  The estimates are available from the author upon request. 
23 Prior to the 1994 Supplement, the DWS asked workers if they had lost a job in the last five years.  For 
consistency purposes, I limited the analysis to those workers who had lost a job in the last three years.  
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probe the importance of this problem, I re-estimate the equations using a sample of 
workers who were displaced at least a year before survey date as these workers should 
have had plenty of time to find a new job.  Again, the results accord with the findings. 
   
 
IV.  Unemployment Duration and Cause of Displacement  
The theoretical model also predicts that laid-off workers who are not recalled 
have longer unemployment duration than workers displaced through plant closings.  As 
Table 1 shows, among permanently displaced workers who were re-employed at a survey 
date, workers displaced through layoffs have longer average initial unemployment spells 
than those of workers displaced through plant closings.  Table 6 shows the analysis of the 
duration of initial spells of joblessness for a sample of 20-61 year-old males permanently 
displaced from full-time, private-sector, jobs not in agriculture or construction.
   The 
sample contains 5,260 complete spells of joblessness and 439 censored spells.
 24 
  I analyze the duration of unemployment spell for this sample using semi-
parametric proportional hazard-model techniques, and controlling for observable 
characteristics.  I find that workers permanently displaced by layoffs have significantly 
longer initial unemployment spells than do those displaced by plant closings.   
An alternative explanation to this result is the depressing effect of recall 
expectations on job search as mentioned by Katz (1986).  To test whether these results 
are explained by the search model or the asymmetric information model, I explore 
various subgroup analyses.   
The asymmetric information model predicts that the higher the information 
content of a recall, all else being equal, the greater the incentive to signal through 
                                                                 
24 Of the 5,260 complete spells, 4,450 were those of individuals who reported post-displacement weekly 
earnings; the rest had the post-displacement earnings information missing and thus, were excluded from the 
earnings analysis of Sections II and III.   Descriptive statistics for this sample used in this section can be 
found in Table 9 in the Appendix.    
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unemployment.  Thus, one would expect laid-off workers to have relatively longer 
unemployment spells than those of similar workers displaced by plant closings in those 
sectors in which employers have more discretion over whom to recall.  Whereas the 
search model predicts that laid-off workers will have relatively longer unemployment 
spells than those of similar workers displaced by plant closings in those sectors in which 
the likelihood of recall is greater. 
Rows 2 and 3 in Table 6 show the estimation of the effect of being laid-off on the 
duration of unemployment spell for the white- and blue-collar samples.  I find that 
workers laid off from white-collar jobs have longer unemployment spells than 
observationally equivalent workers displaced through plant closings.  A smaller 
differential effect is found among workers displaced from blue-collar jobs. These results, 
combined with those from Section II.4., support the asymmetric-information model.   
Rows 4 and 5 in Table 6 display the effects of being laid off on duration in samples of 
workers displaced from low- and high-unionized industries.  Again, as predicted by the 
model, laid-off workers have relatively longer unemployment spells than similar workers 
displaced by plant closings in low-versus high-unionized industries.  
I also analyze the effect of being laid off on duration by distinguishing whether or 
not the workers received advance notice, and whether or not they received unemployment 
insurance benefits.  I find that laid-off workers, regardless of whether they received 
advance notice, have longer unemployment spells than observationally equivalent 
workers displaced by plant closings (rows 6 and 7 in Table 6).  I also find that laid-off 
workers, regardless of whether they receive UI benefits, have longer unemployment 
spells than observationally equivalent workers displaced by plant closings (rows 8 and 9 
in Table 6).   
  Overall, the results above were robust to changes in the covariates, the functional 
form and the subsamples. 
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CONCLUSION  
  In the United States, many laid-off workers are recalled to their original employer.  
If employers have discretion over whom to recall, high-productivity workers are more 
likely to be recalled and may choose to remain unemployed rather than to accept a 
low-wage job offered early in their unemployment spell. If so, unemployment can serve 
as a signal of productivity.  In this case, unemployment duration may be positively 
related to post-displacement wages even among workers who are not recalled.  In 
contrast, because workers displaced through plant closings cannot be recalled, a longer 
duration of unemployment should not have a positive signaling benefit for such workers. 
Analysis of the 1988-2000 Displaced Workers Supplements to the Current Population 
Survey reveals that the earnings and unemployment duration experiences of the two 
groups behave in the predicted way.   
This paper offers a new test of the importance of asymmetric information in the 
labor market.  Evidence has been provided against the “most natural” alternative model, 
the standard search model.  More important, the theoretical model provides the basis for a 
new empirical finding regarding laid-off workers.  After one controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity, the post-displacement earnings of laid-off workers who do not return to 
their former employers increase with the length of unemployment. 
In “Layoffs and Lemons,” Gibbons and Katz showed that prospective employers 
understood adverse selection in the labor market.  The results in my paper indicate that 
workers are also aware of the existence of adverse selection and of its consequences on 
their behavior.  This implies a need for differential unemployment policies by cause of 
displacement.  Further research will analyze the effects of displaced workers’ differential 
behavior by cause of displacement on policies oriented to reduce unemployment duration.   
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Displaced Workers  
Males Reemployed at Survey date 
DWS 1988-2000 
  Means 
 
 
  Reason  
for displacement 
 
Variable 
Entire 
sample 
Plant 
closing 
Layoff 
Layoff = 1 (percent)  54.16  0  100 
Previous tenure (years)  4.70 
(6.09) 
5.46 
(6.61) 
4.05 
(5.53) 
Change in log real weekly earnings  -.121 
(.507) 
-.106 
(.482) 
-.133 
(.526) 
Log of previous weekly earnings  6.25 
(.59) 
6.23 
(.57) 
6.27 
(.60) 
Log of current weekly earnings  6.13 
(.69) 
6.12 
(.60) 
6.13 
(.65) 
Length of unemployment (weeks)  7.88 
(9.01) 
7.20 
(8.86) 
8.47 
(9.10) 
No unemployment after displacement = 1 (percent)  18.45  22.06  15.39 
Advance notice = 1 (percent)  42.20  53.28  32.82 
Current education (years)  13.19 
(2.35) 
13.01 
(2.34) 
13.34 
(2.35) 
Current (age-education-6) (years)  17.32 
(10.14) 
17.62 
(10.08) 
17.07 
(10.20) 
White collar in previous job = 1 (percent)  48.02  46.52  49.29 
Previous job in manufacturing = 1 (percent)  36.54  36.52  36.56 
Current age (years)  36.49 
(10.24) 
36.60 
(10.03) 
36.39 
(10.41) 
Currently married  = 1 (percent)  65.89  67.79  64.27 
Non white = 1 (percent)  9.89  11.27  8.71 
N  4,450  2,040  2,410 
Note.- The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. All weekly wages are deflated by the gross domestic product (GDP) 
deflator  (base year = 1996).  The white-collar sample consists of workers whose pre-displacement occupations were in the managerial 
and professional specialties or in the technical, sales, and administrative support specialties.  
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Table 2 
Gibbons and Katz’s Earnings Equation 
Males Reemployed at Survey Date 
DWS 1988-2000 
     Dependent variables: Weekly earnings
§ 
N = 4,450  Change  Pre-displacement  Post-displacement 
Layoff  -.037
** 
(.015) 
.024
* 
(.014) 
-.010 
(.016) 
R-squared  .0776  .4541  .3482 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  All regressions use the White estimator of variance.  In addition to the variable 
shown in the table, the covariates are: a spline function in previous tenure (with breaks at 1, 2, 3, and 6 years); eleven dummies for 
completed education (one for “one to four years”; one for “five to six years”; one for “seven to eight years”; one for “nine years”; one 
for “ten years”; one for “eleven years”; one for “twelve years”; one for “thirteen years”; one for “fourteen and fifteen years”; one for 
“sixteen years”; one for “seventeen years”); fourteen “year-of-displacement” dummies; ten “previous-industry” dummies; five 
“previous-occupation” dummies; one “experience at displacement” variable and its square; one “pre-displacement marital status” 
dummy; one “non-white” dummy; one “survey pre-1994” dummy; three “region” dummies; and “state” dummies.  Columns (1) and 
(3) also include five “year of survey” dummies; and one “years since displacement” variable. 
§ Dependent variable: col. 1 = log(current earnings/previous earnings); col. 2 = log(previous earnings deflated by GDP deflator); and 
col. 3 = log(current earnings deflated by GDP deflator) 
*  Estimate significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence level 
**  Estimate significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level 
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Table 3 
Post-Displacement Earnings Equation 
Males Reemployed at Survey Date 
DWS 1988-2000 
  Dependent variable: Post-displacement weekly earnings 
 § 
    Reason for displacement 
  Whole sample 
N = 4,450 
Plant Closings 
N = 2,040 
Layoffs 
N = 2,410 
Unemployment spell  -.017
*** 
(.004) 
-.016
*** 
(.004) 
-.007
** 
(.004) 
Unemployment spell 
 Squared 
.0004
*** 
(.0001) 
.0004
*** 
(.0001) 
.0000 
(.0001) 
Layoff Dummy   -.036 
(.022) 
n.a.  n.a. 
Layoff dummy  
x Unemployment spell 
.010
** 
(.005) 
n.a.  n.a. 
Layoff dummy  
x Unemployment spell  
squared 
-.0004
** 
(.0002) 
n.a.  n.a. 
R-squared  .5036  .5251  .5145 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  All regressions use the White estimator of variance.  In addition to the variables 
shown in the table, the covariates are: log (previous earnings deflated by GDP deflator); a spline function in previous tenure (with 
breaks at 1, 2, 3, and 6 years); eleven dummies for completed education (one for “one to four years”; one for “five to six years”; one 
for “seven to eight years”; one for “nine years”; one for “ten years”; one for “eleven years”; one for “twelve years”; one for “thirteen 
years”; one for “fourteen and fifteen years”; one for “sixteen years”; one for “seventeen years”); fourteen “year-of-displacement” 
dummies; five “year of survey” dummies; one “years since displacement” dummy; one “advance notification” dummy; ten “previous-
industry” dummies; five “previous-occupation” dummies; one “experience at displacement” variable and its square; one “pre-
displacement marital status” dummy; one “non-white” dummy; one “survey pre-1994” dummy; three “region” dummies; and “state” 
dummies.   
§ Dependent variable:  log(current earnings deflated by GDP deflator) 
**  Estimate significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level 
***  Estimate significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level 
n.a.    not applicable 
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Table 4 
Post-Displacement Earnings Equation 
Males Reemployed at Survey Date 
DWS 1988-2000 
  Dependent variable: Post-displacement weekly earnings 
 § 
  White-collar 
N = 2,137 
Blue-collar 
N = 2,313 
Low-unionization 
N = 2,269 
High-unionization 
N = 2,181 
Unemployment spell  -.018
*** 
(.006) 
-.017
***  
(.005) 
-.021
*** 
(.005) 
-.013
** 
(.005) 
Unemployment spell 
 Squared 
.0004
** 
(.0002) 
.0004
** 
(.0006) 
.0005
***  
(.0002) 
.0002 
(.0002) 
Layoff Dummy   -.032 
(.032) 
-.037 
(.031) 
-.056
* 
(.033) 
-.038  
(.032) 
Layoff dummy  
x Unemployment spell 
.015
** 
(.007) 
.004 
(.007) 
.017
**  
(.007) 
.005 
(.007) 
Layoff dummy  
x Unemployment spell  
squared 
-.0006
** 
(.0003) 
-.0001 
(.0002) 
-.0006
* 
(.0003) 
-.0002 
(.0002) 
R-squared  .5300  .3739  .5267  .4354 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  All regressions use the White estimator of variance.  In addition to the variables 
shown in the table, the covariates are: log (previous earnings deflated by GDP deflator); a spline function in previous tenure (with 
breaks at 1, 2, 3, and 6 years); eleven dummies for completed education (one for “one to four years”; one for “five to six years”; one 
for “seven to eight years”; one for “nine years”; one for “ten years”; one for “eleven years”; one for “twelve years”; one for “thirteen 
years”; one for “fourteen and fifteen years”; one for “sixteen years”; one for “seventeen years”); fourteen “year-of-displacement” 
dummies; five “year of survey” dummies; one “years since displacement” dummy; one “advance notification” dummy; ten “previous-
industry” dummies; five “previous-occupation” dummies; one “experience at displacement” variable and its square; one “pre-
displacement marital status” dummy; one “non-white” dummy; one “survey pre-1994” dummy; three “region” dummies; and “state” 
dummies.   
§ Dependent variable:  log(current earnings deflated by GDP deflator) 
*         Estimate significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence level 
**  Estimate significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level 
***  Estimate significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level 
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Table 5 
Post-Displacement Earnings Equation  
Males Reemployed at Survey Date 
DWS 1988-2000 
  Dependent variable: Post-displacement weekly earnings 
 § 
  No advance notice 
N = 2,572 
Advance Notice        
N = 1,878 
No UI benefits 
N = 2,439 
UI benefits 
N = 1,988 
Unemployment spell  -.021
***  
(.006) 
-.012
** 
(.005) 
-.026
*** 
(.006) 
-.009 
(.006) 
Unemployment spell 
    Squared 
.0005
** 
(.0002) 
.0003 
(.0002) 
.0008
*** 
(.0002) 
.0002 
(.0002) 
Layoff dummy   -.074
** 
(.033) 
.033 
(.032) 
-.014 
(.025) 
-.122
** 
(.054) 
Layoff dummy x 
   unemployment spell 
.017
** 
(.007) 
-.005 
(.008) 
.017
** 
(.008) 
.018
** 
(.008) 
(Layoff dummy x 
   unemployment spell ) 
   squared 
-.0005
** 
(.0002) 
.0000 
(.0003) 
-.0007
** 
(.0003) 
-.0005
** 
(.0002) 
R-squared  .4897  .5579  .5645  .4533 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  All regressions use the White estimator of variance.  In addition to the variables 
shown in the table, the covariates are: log (previous earnings deflated by GDP deflator); a spline function in previous tenure (with 
breaks at 1, 2, 3, and 6 years); eleven dummies for completed education (one for “one to four years”; one for “five to six years”; one 
for “seven to eight years”; one for “nine years”; one for “ten years”; one for “eleven years”; one for “twelve years”; one for “thirteen 
years”; one for “fourteen and fifteen years”; one for “sixteen years”; one for “seventeen years”); fourteen “year-of-displacement” 
dummies; five “year of survey” dummies; one “years since displacement” dummy; one “advance notification” dummy; ten “previous-
industry” dummies; five “previous-occupation” dummies; one “experience at displacement” variable and its square; one “pre-
displacement marital status” dummy; one “non-white” dummy; one “survey pre-1994” dummy; three “region” dummies; and “state” 
dummies.   Columns (3) and (4) also include one “advance notice” dummy. 
§ Dependent variable:  log(current earnings deflated by GDP deflator) 
**  Estimate significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level 
***  Estimate significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level 
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Table 6 
Semi-Parametric Hazard Model Estimates 
Males Including Those Who Did Not Find a Job at Survey Date 
DWS 1988-2000 
 
Dependent variable = Log (weeks of joblessness) 
Cox proportional hazard model specification 
  Layoff dummy  Log likelihood 
1. Whole sample                   N = 5,699 
 
-.199
*** 
(.026) 
-43,594.72 
2. White-collar workers        N = 2,683 
    
-.243
***H 
(.040) 
-18,470.28 
3. Blue-collar workers          N = 3,016 
     
-.164
*** 
(.035) 
-21,153.27 
4. Non-unionized workers    N = 2,841 
    
-.252
*** 
HHH 
(.038) 
-19,771.32 
5. Unionized workers           N = 2,858  -.153
***  
(.037) 
-19,860.43 
6. No advance notice           N = 3,285  -.170
*** 
(.035) 
-23,293.39 
7. Advance notice                N = 2,414  -.239
*** 
(.039) 
-16,380.24 
8. No UI benefits                 N = 2,942  -.146
***HH 
(.034) 
-20,801.69 
9. UI benefits                       N = 2,727  -.131
*** 
(.039) 
-18,766.00 
Note: The reported models were estimated by maximum likelihood with censoring explicitly treated using the DEAD option in 
STATA.  The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  All regressions use the White estimator of variance.  The reported 
specifications include: log (previous earnings deflated by GDP deflator); tenure; eleven dummies for completed education (one for 
“one to four years”; one for “five to six years”; one for “seven to eight years”; one for “nine years”; one for “ten years”; one for 
“eleven years”; one for “twelve years”; one for “thirteen years”; one for “fourteen and fifteen years”; one for “sixteen years”; one for 
“seventeen years”); fourteen “year-of-displacement” dummies; five “year of survey” dummies;  one “years since displacement” 
variable; one “advance notification” dummy; ten “previous-industry” dummies; five “previous-occupation” dummies; one “experience 
at displacement” variable and its square; one “pre-displacement marital status” dummy; one “non-white” dummy; one “survey pre-
1994” dummy; three “region” dummies; and “state” dummies.   
***  Estimate significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level 
H      Estimate is significantly different from that of the complimentary subgroup at the 90% confidence level 
HH      Estimate is significantly different from that of the complimentary subgroup at the 95% confidence level 
HHH     Estimate is significantly different from that of the complimentary subgroup at the 99% confidence level 
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APPENDIX 
A.  Characterization of equilibria 
Lets define 
) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 (
a a
a
h
- + -
-
=
r
r
, where h is the probability that a G -type worker accepts a 
new job offer in the second period when all workers choose to reject the first period offer. 
Let G w and  B w  be the expected productivity of a G -type worker and a B -type worker, 
respectively, at a new job, where  G w and  B w  are defined as: 
    L p H p w G G G ) 1 ( - + =  
and     L p H p w B B B ) 1 ( - + =  
 
Proof of theorem 1.  Suppose that there is an equilibrium in which some workers prefer to 
wait unemployed than to accept the job right away.  Then, 
G w l h W w l h U w r rH + ‡ - + ) , , , 1 ( ) , , , 2 ( ) 1 (   (5) 
B w l h W w l h U w + ‡ ) , , , 1 ( ) , , , 2 (     (6) 
where  ) , , , 1 ( l h W w  and  ) , , , 2 ( l h U w are the wages offered to displaced workers who accept a 
job in the first period and in the second period, respectively.  Consistency requires that 
L l h W w ‡ ) , , , 1 ( and  H l h U w £ ) , , , 2 ( . Inequalities (5) and (6) become 
L p H p L H G G ) 1 ( - + + ‡           (7) 
L p H p L H L L ) 1 ( - + + ‡           (8) 
respectively, and since  H L p p < ,  inequality (1) follows. 
 
Proof of lemma 1.  Expressions (2) and (3) can be rewritten as  
    G B G w w w r rH + ‡ - + ) 1 (    (9) 
and     B G w w 2 <     (10) 
respectively.  Expressions (9) and (10) say that if prospective employers offer a wage of  G w to 
workers who reject the first period offer, and a wage of  B w to workers who accept the first period 
offer, then it is optimal for G-type workers to reject the first-period offer and for B-type workers  
 
 
 
 
to accept it.  Given these worker’s equilibrium strategies, prospective employers choose a second-
period wage of  G w for laid-off workers who are unemployed during the first period and a wage of 
B w for laid-off workers who accept a job at the beginning of the first period.  Thus, the strategies 
just described are equilibrium strategies. 
 
Lemma 2.  There is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which all G-type workers and a proportion 
t  of B-type workers wait unemployed when:  
    B G B B G p p
L H
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and t  is given by the following equation 
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Proof of lemma 2.  Suppose (11) is true.  Since,  ) , , , 2 ( t l U V ranges from  [ ] B G w w ) 1 ( h h - +  
to wG  and is continuous, there must exist a t ˛[0,1] that satisfies (11).  Reordering expression 
(12) and (13), it is easy to see that they say the following:  If prospective employers offer 
) , , , 2 ( t l U V  to laid-off workers who are unemployed during the first period and wB to laid-off 
workers who accept the first-period job offer, G-type workers will strictly prefer to reject the 
offer while B-type workers will be indifferent between rejecting the second period job offer or 
accepting it. Supposing that all G-type workers and a fraction t of B-type workers reject the first-
period job offer, then prospective employers will offer a wage of  ) , , , 2 ( t l U V  to laid-off workers 
who wait one period unemployed and a first period wage of wB to workers who accept the second 
period job.  Therefore, the strategies described in this lemma are the equilibrium strategies. 
Lemma 3.  There is a perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium in which all types of laid-off workers 
reject job offers in the second period when the following conditions hold: 
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Proof of lemma 3.  Notice that (14) and (15) imply that  
[ ] G B B G w w w w r rH + ‡ - + - + ) 1 ( ) 1 ( h h         (16) 
  B B G w w w 2 ) 1 ( ‡ - + h h     (17) 
Suppose that prospective employers offer [ ] B G w w ) 1 ( h h - + to laid-off workers who were 
unemployed during the first period, and  B w  to laid-off workers who accept a job in the first 
period.  Inequalities (16) and (17) say that both types of workers reject the first period job offer 
and choose to wait one period unemployed.  Supposing that all laid-off workers choose to wait 
unemployed one period, and observing an out-of-equilibrium employment history of accepting a 
second-period job by a worker, it is possible that prospective employers believe that they were 
observing a B-type worker.  Those beliefs would lead them to offer that worker the following 
wage:  B w . 
Under condition (1), I can also construct another hybrid equilibrium, described in Lemma 4.  
However, I find this equilibrium to be unsatisfactory 
 
Remark 1.  There is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which all B-type workers accept a first 
period offer, and a proportion g of G-type workers choose to wait one period unemployed when 
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and g is given by:   
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Proof of remark 1.  The proof is similar to lemma 2 and thus omitted. 
This completes the proof of theorem 1. 
 
  The equilibrium characterized by remark 1 is unsatisfactory for the following reason.  
Suppose that fewer than  g  of  G-type workers choose unemployment, then the expected 
productivity of workers accepting a first period market offer would exceed  ) 0 , , , 1 ( g W V .  Then, 
more G-type workers would accept the first-period market offer, and the equilibrium would not 
be sustained.  Conversely, if more than  g  choose to reject the first-period market offer, the 
expected productivity of laid-off workers who accept the first-period job offer would be lower, 
and fewer G-type workers would choose to accept the first-period job.  Thus, it seems unlikely 
that an economy would ever converge to the equilibrium described in remark 1.
1 
 
B.  Equilibrium with no voluntary unemployment    
Theorem 2. There is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which there is no voluntary unemployment 
when  
    G B B G p p p p r
L H
L
- - - - >
-
] ) ( 1 [ a   (20) 
 
Proof of theorem 2.  Inequality (20) can be rewritten as: 
  [ ] [ ] B G G B G w w r rH w w w ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( a a a a - + - + > + - +   (21) 
On the other hand, since wB >0, I have that 
  [ ] [ ] B G B B G w w w w w ) 1 ( ) 1 ( a a a a - + > + - +   (22) 
Inequalities (21) and (22) say that all laid-off workers choose to accept the first period wage.  
Since all workers choose to work during the first period, firms offer them a first-period wage of 
                                                                 
1 Notice that the other hybrid equilibrium does not have this instability problem.  If the fraction of B-type 
workers who rejected the offer increased (or decreased), this would lead to lower (or higher) earnings for  
 
 
 
 
[ ] B G w w ) 1 ( a a - + .  Firms can have consistent beliefs that if the out-of-equilibrium action 
“being unemployed for one period” is observed, it would have been taken by a randomly selected 
worker.  Thus, they can set the wage offered to workers who are unemployed during the first 
period to [ ] B G w w ) 1 ( a a - + . 
 
C.  Equilibrium refinements 
  In this section, I apply the Cho Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion to my model.  Under 
certain conditions, the equilibrium in theorem 2 fails to satisfy the intuitive criterion.  
 
Theorem 3.  The equilibrium with no voluntary unemployment described in theorem 2 fails to 
satisfy the intuitive criterion if and only if 
    B B G G p p p p r
L H
L
- - - - £
-
) ( ) 1 ( a    (23) 
and     ) ( B G G p p p
L H
L
- - >
-
a   (24) 
 
 
Proof of theorem 3.  I first show that (23) and (24) are sufficient.  Inequalities (23) and (24) can 
be rewritten 
    [ ] G G B G w r rH w w w ) 1 ( ) 1 ( - + £ + - + a a     (25) 
and  
    [ ] G B B G w w w w > + - + ) 1 ( a a     (26) 
Inequality (26) implies that it is an out-of-equilibrium strategy for a B-type worker to reject a 
first-period job, whereas inequality (25) implies that it is not an out-of-equilibrium strategy for a 
G-type worker to reject a first-period job.  Thus, if a laid-off worker chooses to wait unemployed, 
he must be a G-type laid-off worker.  Inequality (23) implies that the equilibrium with no 
voluntary unemployment fails to satisfy the intuitive criterion. 
  Inequalities (23) and (24) are not only a sufficient condition, but also necessary ones.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
those who wait unemployed.  Thus, this would bring these workers back to the postulated distribution of 
actions.  
 
 
 
 
If [ ] G B B G w w w w > + - + ) 1 ( a a , then a B-type worker would not benefit from waiting 
unemployed one period even when by doing so he would be identified as an G-type laid-off 
worker.  And if  [ ] G G B G w r rH w w w ) 1 ( ) 1 ( - + £ + - + a a then it would be optimal for a G-
type worker to reject a first-period offer. 
 
Theorem 4.  All equilibria with some voluntary unemployment satisfy the intuitive criterion. 
 
Proof of theorem 4.  Since the separating and the two hybrid equilibria do not involve an 
unreached information set, they satisfy the intuitive criterion.  I only need to show that the 
equilibrium in which all laid-off workers choose to wait unemployed for one period satisfies the 
intuitive criterion.  The only way the intuitive criterion would rule out the equilibrium where 
everyone chooses to wait unemployed would be if, when observing an out-of-equilibrium action 
from a worker, prospective employers would believe this worker was a G-type worker.  However, 
since G-type workers have a positive probability of being recalled, this restriction on prospective 
employers’ beliefs is not possible.  Thus, when prospective employers observe a worker 
accepting a firsts-period offer, they believe that he is a B-type worker.  This will dissuade 
workers from accepting an offer in the first period. ~ 
 
Corollary 1. If (23) and (24) hold, the equilibrium outcome that satisfies the intuitive criterion is 
unique and must be one with voluntary unemployment. 
 
Proof of corollary 1. Inequalities (23) and (24) only contradict condition (18) in theorem 1.  
Together with theorems 3 and 4, I know that an equilibrium that satisfies the intuitive criterion 
must be one with voluntary unemployment.  Because the equilibria in lemmas 1-3 in theorem 1 
are mutually exclusive, the conclusion follows.  
  
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for displaced workers who get re-employed  
without unemployment spell using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Males re-employed at survey date 
  Means 
 
 
 
 
Reason  
of displacement 
 
Variables 
Entire 
sample 
Plant 
closing 
Layoff 
Layoff = 1 (percent)  45.19  0  100.00 
Previous tenure (years)  5.65 
(6.61) 
6.21 
(6.76) 
4.98 
(6.37) 
Change in log real weekly earnings  -.057 
(.497) 
-.048 
(.472) 
-.068 
(.525) 
Log of previous weekly earnings  6.33 
(.57) 
6.35 
(.56) 
6.31 
(.59) 
Log of current weekly earnings  6.28 
(.64) 
6.30 
(.60) 
6.25 
(.69) 
Length of unemployment (weeks)  0  0  0 
No unemployment after displacement = 1 (percent)  100  100  100 
Advance notice = 1 (percent)  50.06  60.67  37.20 
Current education (years)  13.43 
(2.19) 
13.37 
(2.15) 
13.50 
(2.23) 
Current (age-education-6) (years)  17.37 
(9.78) 
17.73 
(9.54) 
16.94 
(10.04) 
White collar in previous job = 1 (percent)  52.01  51.78  52.29 
Previous job in manufacturing = 1 (percent)  35.08  35.11  35.04 
Current age (years)  36.75 
(9.88) 
37.02 
(9.59) 
36.43 
(10.24) 
Currently married  = 1 (percent)  70.77  73.11  67.92 
Non white = 1 (percent)  7.31  7.11  7.55 
N  821  450  371 
Note.- The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. All weekly wages are deflated by the gross domestic 
product (GDP) deflator  (base year = 1996).  The white-collar sample consists of workers whose pre-displacement 
occupations were in the managerial and professional specialties or in the technical, sales, and administrative support 
specialties 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for displaced workers who are unemployed 
between one and four weeks using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Males re-employed at survey date 
  Means 
 
 
 
 
Reason  
of displacement 
 
Variables 
Entire 
sample 
Plant 
closing 
Layoff 
Layoff = 1 (percent)  52.71  0  100.00 
Previous tenure (years)  3.79 
(5.30) 
4.57 
(5.89) 
3.10 
(4.60) 
Change in log real weekly earnings  -.058 
(.484) 
-.043 
(.436) 
-.071 
(.523) 
Log of previous weekly earnings  6.14 
(.58) 
6.15 
(.57) 
6.14 
(.60) 
Log of current weekly earnings  6.08 
(.61) 
6.11 
(.59) 
6.07 
(.62) 
Length of unemployment (weeks)  2.33 
(1.16) 
2.28 
(1.15) 
2.38 
(1.16) 
No unemployment after displacement = 1 (percent)  0  0  0 
Advance notice = 1 (percent)  39.50  50.47  29.66 
Current education (years)  13.00 
(2.34) 
12.90 
(2.42) 
13.09 
(2.27) 
Current (age-education-6) (years)  16.07 
(10.22) 
16.90 
(10.29) 
15.34 
(10.12) 
White collar in previous job = 1 (percent)  44.03  45.75  42.49 
Previous job in manufacturing = 1 (percent)  35.61  34.68  36.44 
Current age (years)  35.04 
(10.24) 
35.77 
(10.16) 
34.40 
(10.28) 
Currently married  = 1 (percent)  63.69  65.86  61.74 
Non white = 1 (percent)  11.23  12.28  10.29 
N  1,567  741  826 
Note.- The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. All weekly wages are deflated by the gross domestic 
product (GDP) deflator  (base year = 1996).  The white-collar sample consists of workers whose pre-displacement 
occupations were in the managerial and professional specialties or in the technical, sales, and administrative support 
specialties 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for displaced workers who are between 
five and twelve weeks unemployed using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Males re-employed at survey date 
  Means 
 
 
 
 
Reason  
of displacement 
 
Variables 
Entire 
sample 
Plant 
closing 
Layoff 
Layoff = 1 (percent)  58.78  0  100.00 
Previous tenure (years)  4.71 
(6.28) 
5.62 
(7.07) 
4.08 
(5.57) 
Change in log real weekly earnings  -.163 
(.525) 
-.196 
(.552) 
-.139 
(.503) 
Log of previous weekly earnings  6.28 
(.59) 
6.24 
(.59) 
6.31 
(.59) 
Log of current weekly earnings  6.12 
(.65) 
6.04 
(.62) 
6.17 
(.66) 
Length of unemployment (weeks)  8.63 
(2.34) 
8.69 
(2.36) 
8.59 
(2.33) 
No unemployment after displacement = 1 (percent)  0  0  0 
Advance notice = 1 (percent)  40.41  50.44  33.38 
Current education (years)  13.23 
(2.46) 
12.88 
(2.48) 
13.48 
(2.42) 
Current (age-education-6) (years)  17.71 
(10.10) 
17.93 
(10.09) 
17.55 
(10.11) 
White collar in previous job = 1 (percent)  49.86  44.54  53.60 
Previous job in manufacturing = 1 (percent)  35.82  36.03  35.68 
Current age (years)  36.92 
(10.14) 
36.78 
(10.00) 
37.02 
(10.24) 
Currently married  = 1 (percent)  66.25  67.47  65.39 
Non white = 1 (percent)  10.08  13.32  7.81 
N  1,111  458  653 
Note.- The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. All weekly wages are deflated by the gross domestic 
product (GDP) deflator  (base year = 1996).  The white-collar sample consists of workers whose pre-displacement 
occupations were in the managerial and professional specialties or in the technical, sales, and administrative support 
specialties.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for displaced workers who are unemployed 
between thirteen and thirty-six weeks using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Males re-employed at survey date 
  Means 
 
 
 
 
Reason  
of displacement 
 
Variables 
Entire 
sample 
Plant 
closing 
Layoff 
Layoff = 1 (percent)  58.89  0  100.00 
Previous tenure (years)  5.33 
(6.41) 
6.10 
(6.99) 
4.80 
(5.92) 
Change in log real weekly earnings  -.230 
(.508) 
-.188 
(.464) 
-.260 
(.535) 
Log of previous weekly earnings  6.31 
(.578) 
6.23 
(.54) 
6.38 
(.59) 
Log of current weekly earnings  6.08 
(.60) 
6.04 
(.56) 
6.12 
(.63) 
Length of unemployment (weeks)  22.96 
(6.22) 
23.04 
(6.43) 
22.91 
(6.08) 
No unemployment after displacement = 1 (percent)  0  0  0 
Advance notice = 1 (percent)  41.96  53.45  33.92 
Current education (years)  13.26 
(2.35) 
12.97 
(2.21) 
13.46 
(2.42) 
Current (age-education-6) (years)  18.89 
(10.14) 
18.53 
(10.19) 
19.14 
(10.10) 
White collar in previous job = 1 (percent)  49.00  44.24  52.32 
Previous job in manufacturing = 1 (percent)  40.17  42.20  38.75 
Current age (years)  37.12 
(10.35) 
37.48 
(10.23) 
38.58 
(10.42) 
Currently married  = 1 (percent)  64.88  65.73  64.29 
Non white = 1 (percent)  9.67  11.76  8.21 
N  951  391  560 
Note.- The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. All weekly wages are deflated by the gross domestic 
product (GDP) deflator  (base year = 1996).  The white-collar sample consists of workers whose pre-displacement 
occupations were in the managerial and professional specialties or in the technical, sales, and administrative support 
specialties.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for displaced workers by whether they were displaced  
from white- or blue -collar jobs using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Males re-employed at survey date 
  Means 
  White-collar  Blue-collar 
 
 
  Reason  
of displacement 
 
 
Reason  
of displacement 
 
Variables 
Entire 
sample 
Plant 
closing 
Layoff  Entire 
sample 
Plant 
closing 
Layoff 
Layoff = 1 (percent)  55.59  0  100.00  52.83  0  100.00 
Previous tenure (years)  5.16  
(6.34) 
5. 70 
(6.73) 
4.72 
(5.98) 
4.27 
(5.81) 
5.25 
(6.50) 
3.39 
(4.97) 
Change in log real weekly earnings   -.134 
(.507) 
    -.120 
(.489)                                                                                 
 -145 
(.521) 
-.108 
(.507) 
-.094 
(.477) 
-.121 
(.532) 
Log of previous weekly earnings  6.48 
(.58) 
6.43 
(.58) 
6.52 
(.59) 
6.03 
(.50) 
6.05 
(.50) 
6.02 
(.51) 
Log of current weekly earnings  6.35 
(.64) 
6.31 
(.64) 
6.37 
(.65) 
5.93 
(.54) 
5.95 
(.51) 
5.90 
(.56) 
Length of unemployment (weeks)  7.99 
(8.97) 
6.81 
(8.53) 
8.93 
(9.20) 
7.79 
(9.05) 
7.53 
(9.13) 
8.01 
(8.97) 
No unemployment after 
displacement = 1 (percent) 
19.98  24.55  16.33  17.03  19.89  14.48 
Advance notice = 1 (percent)  41.88  54.48  31.82  42.50  52.25  33.80 
Current education (years)  14.43 
(2.03) 
14.23  
(2.05) 
14.58 
(2.00) 
12.05 
(2.03) 
11.95 
(2.04) 
12.14 
(2.02) 
Current (age-education-6) (years)  17.95 
(10.02) 
17.88 
(9.87) 
18.01 
(10.13) 
16.74 
(10.23) 
17.41 
(10.25) 
16.15 
(10.18) 
White collar in previous job = 1 
(percent) 
100.00  100.00  100.00  0  0  0 
Previous job in manufacturing = 1 
(percent) 
25.88  24.55  26.94  46.39  46.93  45.91 
Current age (years)  38.34 
(10.10) 
38.05 
(9.88)             
38.57 
(10.28) 
34.78 
(10.06) 
35.33 
(9.99) 
34.28 
(10.11) 
Currently married  = 1 (percent)  67.57  67.76  67.42  64.33  67.83  61.21 
Non white = 1 (percent)  7.77  8.43  7.24  11.85  13.75  10.15 
N  2,137  949  1,188  2,313  1,091  1,222 
Note.- The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. All weekly wages are deflated by the gross domestic 
product (GDP) deflator  (base year = 1996).  The white-collar sample consists of workers whose pre-displacement 
occupations were in the managerial and professional specialties or in the technical, sales, and administrative support 
specialties. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics for displaced workers by whether they were displaced from 
industries with high-unionization rates or not using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Males re-employed at survey date 
  Means 
  Low-unionization pre-
displacement jobs 
High-unionization pre-
displacement jobs 
 
 
  Reason  
of displacement 
 
 
Reason  
of displacement 
 
Variables 
Entire 
sample 
Plant 
closing 
Layoff  Entire 
sample 
Plant 
closing 
Layoff 
Layoff = 1 (percent)  53.77  0  100.00  54.56  0  100.00 
Previous tenure (years)  4.03 
(5.41) 
4.58 
(5.90) 
3.56 
(4.90) 
5.39 
(6.65) 
6.39 
(7.17) 
4.55 
(6.07) 
Change in log real weekly earnings  -.105 
(.516) 
-.083 
(.487) 
-.123 
(.540) 
-.137 
(.496) 
-.130 
(.477) 
-.143 
(.511) 
Log of previous weekly earnings  6.21 
(.61) 
6.18 
(.59) 
6.24 
(.62) 
6.29 
(.56) 
6.28 
(.54) 
6.29 
(.58) 
Log of current weekly earnings  6.11 
(.65) 
6.09 
(.63) 
6.12 
(.67) 
6.15 
(.60) 
6.15 
(.57) 
6.15 
(.62) 
Length of unemployment (weeks)  7.55 
(8.78) 
6.69 
(8.54) 
8.29 
(8.91) 
8.23 
(9.24) 
7.73 
(9.16) 
8.65 
(9.29) 
No unemployment after 
displacement = 1 (percent) 
 
18.47 
 
22.97 
 
14.59 
 
18.43 
 
21.09 
 
16.22 
Advance notice = 1 (percent)  37.99  50.33  27.38  46.58  56.41  3840 
Current education (years)  13.49 
(2.36) 
13.32 
(2.38) 
13.64 
(2.33) 
12.88 
(2.30) 
12.69 
(2.26) 
13.04 
(2.33) 
Current (age-education-6) (years)  16.48 
(10.07) 
16.37 
(9.91) 
16.56 
(10.20) 
18.21 
(10.15) 
18.95 
(10.09) 
17.59 
(10.17) 
White collar in previous job = 1 
(percent) 
61.13  60.15  61.97  34.39  32.09  36.30 
Previous job in manufacturing = 1 
(percent) 
0  0  0  74.55  75.18  74.03 
Current age (years)  35.92 
(10.21) 
35.63 
(9.95) 
36.18 
(10.43) 
37.07 
(10.23) 
37.62 
(10.01) 
36.61 
(10.40) 
Currently married  = 1 (percent)  62.67  64.06  61.48  69.23  71.75  67.14 
Non white = 1 (percent)  10.14  11.82  8.69  9.63  10.07  8.74 
N  2,269  1,049  1,220  2,181  991  1,190 
Note.- The “high-unionization pre-displacement jobs” sample consists of workers whose pre-displacement industries 
had unionization rates above the sample mean rate.  The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. All weekly 
wages are deflated by the gross domestic product (GDP) deflator  (base year = 1996).  The white-collar sample consists 
of workers whose pre-displacement occupations were in the managerial and professional specialties or in the technical, 
sales, and administrative support specialties.  
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics for displaced workers by whether 
they received advance notice using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Males re-employed at survey date 
  Means 
  No advance notice  Advance notice 
 
 
  Reason  
of displacement 
 
 
Reason  
of displacement 
 
Variables 
Entire 
sample 
Plant 
closing 
Layoff  Entire 
sample 
Plant 
closing 
Layoff 
Layoff = 1 (percent)  62.95  0  100.00  42.12  0  100.00 
Previous tenure (years)  4.16 
(5.72) 
4.70 
(6.29) 
3.84 
(5.33) 
5.43 
(6.50) 
6.13 
(6.81) 
4.47 
(5.90) 
Change in log real weekly earnings  -.122 
(.531) 
-.110 
(.514) 
 -.128 
(.540) 
 -.119  
(.472) 
-.102 
(.454) 
-.142 
(.496)                   
Log of previous weekly earnings  6.23 
(.60) 
6.20 
(.59) 
6.25 
(.60) 
6.27 
(.57) 
6.25 
(.55) 
6.30 
(.59) 
Log of current weekly earnings  6.11 
(.64) 
6.09 
(.64) 
6.12 
(.65) 
6.15 
(.61) 
6.15 
 (.57) 
6.16 
(.65) 
Length of unemployment (weeks)  8.00 
(8.91) 
7.34 
(8.63) 
8.39 
(9.05) 
7.72  
(9.15) 
7.07 
(9.06) 
8.62 
(9.20) 
No unemployment after displacement = 
1 (percent) 
15.94  18.58  14.39  21.88  25.12  17.45 
Advance notice = 1 (percent)  0  0  0  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Current education (years)  13.16 
(2.35) 
12.94 
(2.33) 
13.29 
(2.35) 
13.23 
(2.36) 
13.08 
(2.35) 
13.45 
(2.35) 
Current (age-education-6) (years)  17.56 
(10.32) 
17.56 
(10.27) 
17.56 
(10.36) 
17.00 
(9.89) 
17.68 
(9.91) 
16.07 
(9.78) 
White collar in previous job = 1 
(percent) 
48.29  45.33  50.03  47.66  47.56  47.79 
Previous job in manufacturing = 1 
(percent) 
32.89  31.48  33.72  41.53  40.94  42.35 
Current age (years)  36.69 
(10.40) 
36.46 
(10.13) 
36.83 
(10.56) 
36.20 
(10.00) 
36.72 
(9.93) 
35.50 
(10.06) 
Currently married  = 1 (percent)  65.24  66.74  64.36  66.77  68.72  64.10 
Non white = 1 (percent)  9.72  11.75  8.52  10.11  10.86  9.10 
N  2,572  953  1,619  1,878  1,087  791 
Note.- The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. All weekly wages are deflated by the gross domestic 
product (GDP) deflator  (base year = 1996).  The white-collar sample consists of workers whose pre-displacement 
occupations were in the managerial and professional specialties or in the technical, sales, and administrative support 
specialties.  
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics for displaced workers by whether they received 
unemployment insurance benefits using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Males re-employed at survey date 
  Means 
  No UI benefits  UI benefits 
 
 
  Reason  
of displacement 
 
 
Reason  
of displacement 
 
Variables 
Entire 
sample 
Plant 
closing 
Layoff  Entire 
sample 
Plant 
closing 
Layoff 
Layoff = 1 (percent)  50.88  0  100.00  58.20  0  100.00 
Previous tenure (years)  4.26 
(5.86) 
4.81 
(6.02) 
3.73 
(5.66) 
5.25 
(6.33) 
6.43 
(7.30) 
4.40 
(5.38) 
Change in log real weekly earnings  -.064 
(.498) 
-.067 
(.484) 
-.062 
(.512) 
-.190 
(.508) 
-.165 
(.474) 
-.208 
(.531) 
Log of previous weekly earnings  6.21 
(.63) 
6.23 
(.61) 
6.20 
(.65) 
6.30 
(.53) 
6.23 
(.51) 
6.34 
(.54) 
Log of current weekly earnings  6.15 
(.65) 
6.16 
(.62) 
6.14 
(.68) 
6.11 
(.60) 
6.07 
(.57) 
6.13 
(.61) 
Length of unemployment (weeks)  4.00 
(6.18) 
3.55 
(5.89) 
4.44 
(6.42) 
12.62 
(9.63) 
12.43 
(9.73) 
12.76 
(9.57) 
No unemployment after displacement 
= 1 (percent) 
31.04 
 
34.97  27.24  3.12  3.49  2.85 
Advance notice = 1 (percent)  40.71  51.59  30.22  44.11  56.08  35.52 
Current education (years)  13.20 
(2.38) 
13.10 
(2.35) 
13.30 
(2.41) 
13.18 
(2.31) 
12.89 
(2.33) 
13.39 
(2.28) 
Current (age-education-6) (years)  16.48 
(10.14) 
16.80 
(9.97) 
16.17 
(10.30) 
18.40 
(10.05) 
18.84 
(10.12) 
18.09 
(9.98) 
White collar in previous job = 1 
(percent) 
48.30  48.66  47.95  47.79 
 
43.68  50.73 
Previous job in manufacturing = 1 
(percent) 
32.10  31.64  32.55  41.90  43.32  40.88 
Current age (years)  35.65 
(10.29) 
35.86 
(9.98) 
35.45 
(10.59) 
37.55 
(10.07) 
37.70 
(10.00) 
37.45 
(10.12) 
Currently married  = 1 (percent)  64.45  67.36  61.64  67.76  68.59  67.16 
Non white = 1 (percent)  10.05  11.35  8.78  9.76  11.19  8.73 
N  2,439  1,198  1,241  1,988  831  1,157 
Note.- The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. All weekly wages are deflated by the gross domestic 
product (GDP) deflator  (base year = 1996).  The white-collar sample consists of workers whose pre-displacement 
occupations were in the managerial and professional specialties or in the technical, sales, and administrative support 
specialties.  
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Descriptive statistics for displaced workers using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Males including those who did not find a job at survey date 
  Means 
 
 
 
 
Reason  
of displacement 
 
Variables 
Entire 
sample 
Plant 
closing 
Layoff 
Layoff = 1 (percent)  54.69  0  100.00 
Previous tenure (years)  4.91 
(6.36) 
5.70 
(6.94) 
4.25 
(5.75) 
Change in log real weekly earnings  -.149 
(.567) 
-.128 
(.515) 
-.166 
(.61) 
Log of previous weekly earnings  6.25 
(.59) 
6.23 
(.57) 
6.27 
(.61) 
Log of current weekly earnings  6.10 
(.67) 
6.10 
(.63) 
6.11 
(.60) 
Length of unemployment (weeks)  12.01 
(17.03) 
10.93 
(16.31) 
12.90 
(17.55) 
No unemployment after displacement = 1 (percent)  16.35  19.52  13.73 
Advance notice = 1 (percent)  42.36  53.21  33.37 
Current education (years)  13.09 
(2.40) 
12.90 
(2.38) 
13.25 
(2.40) 
Current (age-education-6) (years)  17.86 
(10.36) 
18.19 
(10.33) 
17.58 
(10.39) 
White collar in previous job = 1 (percent)  47.08  45.47  48.41 
Previous job in manufacturing = 1 (percent)  37.27  36.64  37.79 
Current age (years)  36.93 
(10.38) 
37.06 
(10.17) 
36.81 
(10.55) 
Currently married  = 1 (percent)  65.17  66.65  63.94 
Non white = 1 (percent)  10.04  11.00  9.24 
N  5,699  2,582  3,117 
Note.- The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. All weekly wages are deflated by the gross domestic 
product (GDP) deflator  (base year = 1996).  The white-collar sample consists of workers whose pre-displacement 
occupations were in the managerial and professional specialties or in the technical, sales, and administrative support 
specialties. 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Earnings equation using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Males re-employed at survey date 
     Dependent variables: Weekly earnings
§ 
N =4,450  Change   Pre-displacement  Post-displacement 
Unemployment spell  -.017
*** 
(.004) 
-.002 
(.004) 
-.042
*** 
(.004) 
Unemployment spell squared  .0004
*** 
(.0001) 
.0001 
(.0001) 
.0004
*** 
(.0001) 
Layoff dummy   -.040
* 
(.024) 
-.004 
(.022) 
-.042 
(.026) 
Layoff dummy  
x unemployment spell 
.009
* 
(.005) 
.003 
(.005) 
.012
** 
(.006) 
Layoff dummy  
x unemployment spell squared 
-.0004
** 
(.0002) 
.0000 
(.0002) 
-.0004
* 
(.0002) 
R-squared  .0939  .4556  .3557 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  All regressions use the White estimator of variance.  In addition 
to the variable shown in the table, the covariates are: a spline function in previous tenure (with breaks at 1, 2, 3, and 6 
years); eleven dummies for completed education (one for “one to four years”; one for “five to six years”; one for 
“seven to eight years”; one for “nine years”; one for “ten years”; one for “eleven years”; one for “twelve years”; one for 
“thirteen years”; one for “fourteen and fifteen years”; one for “sixteen years”; one for “seventeen years”); fourteen 
“year-of-displacement” dummies; one “advance notification” dummy; ten “previous-industry” dummies; five 
“previous-occupation” dummies; one “experience at displacement” variable and its square; one “pre-displacement 
marital status” dummy; one “non-white” dummy; one “survey pre-1994” dummy; three “region” dummies; and “state” 
dummies.  Columns (1) and (3) also include five “year of survey” dummies; and one “years since displacement” 
variable. 
§ Dependent variable: col. 1 = log(current earnings/previous earnings); col. 2 = log (previous earnings deflated by GDP 
deflator); and col. 3 = log(current earnings deflated by GDP deflator) 
*         Estimate significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence level 
**  Estimate significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level 
***  Estimate significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level  
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Earnings equation using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Workers displaced from white- and blue-collar jobs, re-employed at survey date 
  Dependent variables: Weekly earnings
§ 
     White-collar (N=2,137)  Blue-collar (N=2,313) 
  Change  Pre- 
displacement 
Post- 
displacement 
Change   Pre- 
displacement 
Post- 
displacement 
Unemployment spell  -.016
*** 
(.006) 
-.005 
(.006) 
-.022
*** 
(.007) 
-.016
*** 
(.005) 
-.002 
(.004) 
-.018
*** 
(.005) 
Unemployment spell squared  .0003 
(.0002) 
.0002 
(.0002) 
.0006
** 
(.0002) 
.0003
* 
(.0002) 
.0000 
(.0002) 
.0004
* 
(.0002) 
Layoff dummy   -.041 
(.034) 
.019 
(.034) 
-.020 
(.038) 
-.041 
(.035) 
-.007 
(.030) 
-.048 
(.034) 
Layoff dummy  
x unemployment spell 
.013
* 
(.008) 
.005 
(.007) 
.018
** 
(.009) 
.003 
(.008) 
.003 
(.006) 
.006 
(.007) 
Layoff dummy  
x unemployment spell squared 
-.0005
** 
(.0003) 
-.0001 
(.0003) 
-.0007
** 
(.0003) 
-.0001 
(.0003) 
.0000 
(.0002) 
-.0001 
(.0003) 
R-squared  .1364  .4189  .3388  .1053  .3678  .2595 
Note: The white-collar sample consists of workers whose pre-displacement occupations were in the managerial and 
professional specialties or in the technical, sales and administrative support specialties.  The numbers in parentheses are 
standard errors.  All regressions use the White estimator of variance. The covariates are described in table 10. 
§ Dependent variable: col. 1 and 4 = log (current earnings/previous earnings); col. 2 and 5 = log (previous earnings 
deflated by GDP deflator); and col. 3 and 6 = log (current earnings deflated by GDP deflator) 
 
 
Table 12. Earnings equation using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Workers displaced from low- and high-unionized industries, re-employed at survey date 
  Dependent variables: Weekly earnings
§ 
     Low-unionization  
pre-displacement jobs (N=2,269) 
High-unionization  
pre-displacement jobs (N=2,181) 
  Change  Pre- 
displacement 
Post- 
Displacement
Change   Pre- 
displacement 
Post- 
displacement 
Unemployment spell  -.018
*** 
(.036) 
-.009 
(.006) 
-.027
*** 
(.006) 
-.015
*** 
(.005) 
.005 
(.005) 
-.010
* 
(.006) 
Unemployment spell squared  .0004
* 
(.0002) 
.0003 
(.0002) 
.0007
*** 
(.0002) 
.0003
* 
(.0002) 
-.0002 
(.0002) 
.0001 
(.0002) 
Layoff dummy   -.060
* 
(.036) 
.012 
(.034) 
-.069
* 
(.038) 
-.039 
(.034) 
-.001 
(.030) 
-.040 
(.036) 
Layoff dummy  
x unemployment spell 
.014
* 
(.008) 
.007 
(.008) 
.021
** 
(.009) 
.005 
(.007) 
.001 
(.006) 
.005 
(.008) 
Layoff dummy  
x unemployment spell squared 
-.0006
** 
(.0003) 
-.0001 
(.0003) 
-.0007
** 
(.0003) 
-.0002 
(.0002) 
.0001 
(.0002) 
-.0001 
(.0003) 
R-squared  .1028  ..4496  .3687  .1189  .4820  .3772 
Note: The “high-unionization pre-displacement jobs” sample consists of workers whose pre-displacement industries 
had unionization rates above the sample mean rate.  The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  All regressions 
use the White estimator of variance.  The covariates are described in table 10. 
§ Dependent variable: col. 1 and 4 = log(current earnings/previous earnings); col. 2 and 5 = log (previous earnings 
deflated by GDP deflator); and col. 3 and 6 = log(current earnings deflated by GDP deflator)  
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Earnings equation using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Workers who did and did not receive advance notice, re-employed at survey date 
  Dependent variables: Weekly earnings
§ 
  No advance notice  
N=2,572 
Advance notice  
N=1,878 
  Change  Pre- 
displacement 
Post- 
displacement 
Change   Pre- 
displacement 
Post- 
displacement 
Unemployment spell  -.017
*** 
(.006) 
-.007 
(.005) 
-.024
*** 
(.006) 
-.012
* 
(.005) 
.001 
(.005) 
-.011
* 
(.006) 
Unemployment spell 
squared 
.0004
* 
(.0002) 
.0002 
(.0002) 
.0005
*** 
(.0002) 
.0003 
(.0002) 
.0000 
(.0002) 
.0002 
(.0001) 
Layoff dummy   -.057 
(.036) 
-.040 
(.033) 
-.092
** 
(.037) 
.015 
(.034) 
.041 
(.032) 
.058 
(.038) 
Layoff dummy  
x unemployment spell 
.013
* 
(.008) 
.010 
(.007) 
.023
*** 
(.008) 
-.003 
(.008) 
-.005 
(.007) 
-.008 
(.009) 
Layoff dummy  
x unemployment spell 
squared 
-.0004
* 
(.0003) 
-.0002 
(.0002) 
-.0006
** 
(.0003) 
-.0001 
(.0003) 
.0003 
(.0003) 
.0002 
(.0003) 
R-squared  .0943  .4535  .3581  .1505  .4874  .3980 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  All regressions use the White estimator of variance.  The 
covariates are described in table 10. 
§ Dependent variable: col. 1 and 4 = log(current earnings/previous earnings); col. 2 and 5 = log (previous earnings 
deflated by GDP deflator); and col. 3 and 6 = log(current earnings deflated by GDP deflator) 
 
 
Table 14. Earnings equation using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Workers who received unemployment insurance benefits or not, re-employed at survey date 
  Dependent variables: Weekly earnings
§ 
     No unemployment benefits   
N=2,439 
Unemployment benefits  
N=1,988 
  Change  Pre- 
displacement 
Post- 
displacement 
Change   Pre- 
displacement 
Post- 
displacement 
Unemployment spell  -.023
*** 
(.007) 
-.006 
(.007) 
-.030
*** 
(.007) 
-.014
*** 
(.006) 
.010
* 
(.005) 
-.004 
(.007) 
Unemployment spell 
squared 
.0007
** 
(.0003) 
.0002 
(.0003) 
.0009
*** 
(.0003) 
.0003 
(.0002) 
-.0003 
(.0002) 
.0000 
(.0002) 
Layoff dummy   -.010 
(.027) 
-.023 
(.027) 
-.030 
(.030) 
-.165
*** 
(.058) 
.086 
(.046) 
-.078 
(.060) 
Layoff dummy  
x unemployment spell 
.018
* 
(.009) 
-.002 
(.009) 
.016
* 
(.010) 
.020
** 
(.009) 
-.006 
(.007) 
.015 
(.009) 
Layoff dummy  
x unemployment spell 
squared 
-.0008
* 
(.0004) 
.0002 
(.0004) 
-.0006
* 
(.0004) 
-.0006
** 
(.0003) 
.0002 
(.0002) 
-.0004 
(.0003) 
R-squared  .0870  .4818  .4199  .1266  .4423  .3134 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  All regressions use the White estimator of variance.  The covariates are 
described in table 10. 
§ Dependent variable: col. 1 and 4 = log(current earnings/previous earnings); col. 2 and 5 = log (previous earnings deflated by GDP 
deflator); and col. 3 and 6 = log(current earnings deflated by GDP deflator)  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15. Descriptive statistics for displaced workers by whether they were displaced  
from unionized jobs or not using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Males re-employed at survey date 
  Means 
  Unionized  Non-unionized 
 
 
  Reason  
of displacement 
 
 
Reason  
of displacement 
 
Variables 
Entire 
sample 
Plant 
closing 
Layoff  Entire 
sample 
Plant 
closing 
Layoff 
Layoff = 1 (percent)  56.15  0  100.00  49.90  0  100.00 
Previous tenure (years)  4.37 
(5.78) 
4.89 
(6.10) 
3.96 
(5.49) 
5.96 
(7.23) 
7.21 
(7.96) 
4.71 
(6.19) 
Change in log real weekly earnings  -.099 
(.517) 
-.089 
(.497) 
-.107 
(.532) 
-.179 
(.493) 
-.158 
(.472) 
-.200 
(.513) 
Log of previous weekly earnings  6.25 
(.61) 
6.22 
(.60) 
6.28 
(.62) 
6.26 
(.52) 
6.26 
(.50) 
6.26 
(.54) 
Log of current weekly earnings  6.15 
(.65) 
6.13 
(.64) 
6.17 
(.66) 
6.08 
(.57) 
6.10 
(.53) 
6.06 
(.60) 
Length of unemployment (weeks)  7.40 
(8.70) 
6.54 
(8.40) 
8.06 
(8.87) 
9.03 
(9.71) 
8.40 
(9.58) 
9.67 
(9.81) 
No unemployment after 
displacement = 1 (percent) 
20.01  24.10  16.81  15.80  19.31  12.27 
 
Advance notice = 1 (percent)  36.63  50.04  26.16  54.93  60.75  49.10 
Current education (years)  13.42 
(2.34) 
13.26 
(2.34) 
13.54 
(2.33) 
12.65 
(2.23) 
12.49 
(2.21) 
12.81 
(2.24) 
Current (age-education-6) (years)  17.33 
(10.18) 
17.36 
(10.06) 
17.30 
(10.27) 
17.82 
(10.24) 
18.80 
(10.28) 
16.83 
(10.11) 
White collar in previous job = 1 
(percent) 
56.35  56.14  56.51  27.66  26.51  28.81 
Previous job in manufacturing = 1 
(percent) 
19.62  17.41  21.34  72.92  72.33  73.51 
Current age (years)  36.71 
(10.33) 
36.58 
(10.10) 
36.81 
(10.51) 
36.44 
(10.13) 
37.27 
(10.03) 
35.62 
(10.17 
Currently married  = 1 (percent)  64.24  66.13  62.77  70.28  71.94  68.60 
Non white = 1 (percent)  9.92  11.61  8.61  10.12  11.07  9.17 
N  3,104  1,361  1,743  1,551  777  774 
Note.- The unionized sample consist of workers who reported loosing a unionized pre-displacement job.  Because the 
DWS did not collect information on whether the pre-displacement job was unionized prior to 1994, for those workers 
in the 1988-1992 DWS, we classify displaced from a unionized job if he was displaced from an industry with higher 
than average unionization rates.  The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. All weekly wages are deflated by 
the gross domestic product (GDP) deflator  (base year = 1996).  The white-collar sample consists of workers whose 
pre-displacement occupations were in the managerial and professional specialties or in the technical, sales, and 
administrative support specialties.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16. Post-displacement earnings equation using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Males re-employed at survey date 
  Dependent variable: Post-displacement weekly earnings 
 § 
  Unionized 
N = 1,551 
Non-unionized 
N = 3,104 
Unemployment spell  -.010
* 
(.006) 
-.022
*** 
(.005) 
Unemployment spell 
 Squared 
.0002  
(.0002) 
.0006
*** 
(.0002) 
Layoff Dummy   -.082
* 
(.042) 
-.012  
(.027) 
Layoff dummy  
x Unemployment spell 
.010  
(.008) 
.012
* 
(.006) 
Layoff dummy  
x Unemployment spell  
squared 
-.0003 
(.0003) 
-.0005
** 
(.0002) 
R-squared  .4538  .5213 
Note: The unionized sample consist of workers who reported loosing a unionized pre-displacement job.  Because the 
DWS did not collect information on whether the pre-displacement job was unionized prior to 1994, for those workers 
in the 1988-1992 DWS, we classify displaced from a unionized job if he was displaced from an industry with higher 
than average unionization rates.  The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  All regressions use the White 
estimator of variance.  In addition to the variables shown in the table, the covariates are: log (previous earnings deflated 
by GDP deflator); a spline function in previous tenure (with breaks at 1, 2, 3, and 6 years); eleven dummies for 
completed education (one for “one to four years”; one for “five to six years”; one for “seven to eight years”; one for 
“nine years”; one for “ten years”; one for “eleven years”; one for “twelve years”; one for “thirteen years”; one for 
“fourteen and fifteen years”; one for “sixteen years”; one for “seventeen years”); fourteen “year-of-displacement” 
dummies; five “year of survey” dummies; one “years since displacement” dummy; one “advance notification” dummy; 
ten “previous-industry” dummies; five “previous-occupation” dummies; one “experience at displacement” variable and 
its square; one “pre-displacement marital status” dummy; one “non-white” dummy; one “survey pre-1994” dummy; 
three “region” dummies; and “state” dummies.   
§ Dependent variable:  log(current earnings deflated by GDP deflator) 
*         Estimate significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence level 
**  Estimate significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level 
***  Estimate significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17. Earnings equation using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Workers displaced from unionized jobs or not using the DWS (1988-2000),  
Males re-employed at survey date 
  Dependent variables: Weekly earnings
§ 
     Non-unionized  (N=3,104)  Unionized (N=1,551) 
  Change  Pre- 
displacement 
Post- 
Displacement
Change   Pre- 
displacement 
Post- 
displacement 
Unemployment spell  -.019
*** 
(.005) 
-.008 
(.005) 
-.027
*** 
(.005) 
-.013
** 
(.006) 
.006 
(.036) 
-.007 
(.006) 
Unemployment spell squared  .0005
* 
(.0002) 
.0003 
(.0002) 
.0008
*** 
(.0002) 
.0003 
(.0002) 
-.0003
* 
(.0002) 
.0000 
(.0002) 
Layoff dummy    -.023 
(.028) 
.008 
(.027) 
-.012 
(.030) 
-.077
* 
(.045) 
-.016 
(.036) 
-.091
* 
(.046) 
Layoff dummy  
x unemployment spell 
.010 
(.007) 
.006 
(.006) 
.016
* 
(.007) 
.009 
(.009) 
.001 
(.007) 
.010 
(.009) 
Layoff dummy  
x unemployment spell squared 
-.0004
* 
(.0002) 
-.0002 
(.0002) 
-.0006
* 
(.0003) 
-.0004 
(.0003) 
.0001 
(.0002) 
-.0002 
(.0003) 
R-squared  .0979  ..4673  .3684  .1367  .4575  .3293 
Note: The unionized sample consist of workers who reported loosing a unionized pre-displacement job.  Because the 
DWS did not collect information on whether the pre-displacement job was unionized prior to 1994, for those workers 
in the 1988-1992 DWS, we classify displaced from a unionized job if he was displaced from an industry with higher 
than average unionization rates.  The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  All regressions use the White 
estimator of variance.  The covariates are described in table 10.  For those workers in the 1988-1992 DWS, we classify 
displaced from a unionized job if he was displaced from an industry with higher than average unionization rates. 
§ Dependent variable: col. 1 and 4 = log(current earnings/previous earnings); col. 2 and 5 = log (previous earnings 
deflated by GDP deflator); and col. 3 and 6 = log(current earnings deflated by GDP deflator) 
*         Estimate significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence level 
**  Estimate significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level 
***  Estimate significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 18. Descriptive statistics for displaced workers by cause of displacement  
using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Males re-employed at survey date 
  Means 
 
 
Reason of displacement 
 
Variables 
Plant closing  Slack work  Shift or position 
abolished 
Layoff = 1 (percent)  0  100.00  100.00 
Previous tenure (years)  5.46 
(6.61) 
3.08 
(4.44) 
5.53 
(6.61) 
Change in log real weekly earnings  -.106 
(.482) 
-.111 
(.533) 
-.166 
(.515) 
Log of previous weekly earnings  6.23 
(.57) 
6.13 
(.57) 
6.47 
(.59) 
Log of current weekly earnings  6.12 
(.60) 
6.02 
(.62) 
6.31 
(.66) 
Length of unemployment (weeks)  7.20 
(8.86) 
8.04 
(8.85) 
9.12 
(9.42) 
No unemployment after displacement = 1 
(percent) 
22.06  14.20  17.23 
Advance notice = 1 (percent)  53.28  31.82  34.35 
Current education (years)  13.01 
(2.34) 
12.88 
(2.34) 
14.05 
(2.18) 
Current (age-education-6) (years)  16.39 
(10.17) 
15.94 
(10.12) 
18.80 
(10.08) 
White collar in previous job = 1 (percent)  46.52  38.00  66.60 
Previous job in manufacturing = 1 (percent)  36.52  40.53  30.46 
Current age (years)  36.60 
(10.03) 
34.81 
(10.31) 
38.82 
(10.10) 
Currently married  = 1 (percent)  67.79  60.97  69.33 
Non white = 1 (percent)  11.27  9.34  7.67 
N  2,040  1,458  952 
Note.- The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. All weekly wages are deflated by the gross domestic 
product (GDP) deflator  (base year = 1996).  The white-collar sample consists of workers whose pre-displacement 
occupations were in the managerial and professional specialties or in the technical, sales, and administrative support 
specialties. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 19 Post-displacement earnings equation by cause of displacement  
using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Males re-employed at survey date 
  Dependent variable: Post-displacement weekly earnings 
 § 
  Plant Closings and Slack Work 
N = 3,498 
Plant Closings and Shift or Position Abolished 
N = 2,992 
Unemployment spell  -.017
*** 
(.004) 
-.017
*** 
(.004) 
Unemployment spell 
 Squared 
.0004
***  
(.0001) 
.0004
*** 
(.0001) 
Layoff Dummy   -.041 
(.027) 
-.033  
(.030) 
Layoff dummy  
x Unemployment spell 
.010
*  
(.006) 
.010
* 
(.006) 
Layoff dummy  
x Unemployment spell  
squared 
-.0004
* 
(.0002) 
-.0004
* 
(.0002) 
R-squared  .4908  .5245 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  All regressions use the White estimator of variance.  In addition to the variables 
shown in the table, the covariates are: log (previous earnings deflated by GDP deflator); a spline function in previous tenure (with 
breaks at 1, 2, 3, and 6 years); eleven dummies for completed education (one for “one to four years”; one for “five to six years”; one 
for “seven to eight years”; one for “nine years”; one for “ten years”; one for “eleven years”; one for “twelve years”; one for “thirteen 
years”; one for “fourteen and fifteen years”; one for “sixteen years”; one for “seventeen years”); fourteen “year-of-displacement” 
dummies; five “year of survey” dummies; one “years since displacement” dummy; one “advance notification” dummy; ten “previous-
industry” dummies; five “previous-occupation” dummies; one “experience at displacement” variable and its square; one “pre-
displacement marital status” dummy; one “non-white” dummy; one “survey pre-1994” dummy; three “region” dummies; and “state” 
dummies.   
§ Dependent variable:  log(current earnings deflated by GDP deflator) 
*         Estimate significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence level 
**  Estimate significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level 
***  Estimate significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 20. Earnings equation by cause of displacement using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Workers re-employed at survey date 
  Dependent variables: Weekly earnings
§ 
     Slack work  and plant closings 
 
(N=3,498) 
Shift or position abolished and  
plant closings 
(N=2,992) 
  Change  Pre- 
displacement 
Post- 
displacement 
Change   Pre- 
displacement 
Post- 
Displacement
Unemployment spell  -.016
*** 
(.004) 
-.002 
(.004) 
-.019
*** 
(.004) 
-.016
*** 
(.004) 
-.002 
(.004) 
-.018
*** 
(.004) 
Unemployment spell squared  .0004 
(.0001) 
-.0001 
(.0001) 
.0004
*** 
(.0001) 
.0004
*** 
(.0001) 
.0000 
(.0001) 
.0004
*** 
(.0001) 
Layoff dummy   -.025 
(.029) 
-.040 
(.027) 
-.063
** 
(.030) 
-.058
* 
(.031) 
.049 
(.029) 
-.009 
(.034) 
Layoff dummy  
x unemployment spell 
.008 
(.006) 
.004 
(.006) 
.012
* 
(.007) 
.010 
(.007) 
.002 
(.006) 
.012 
(.007) 
Layoff dummy  
x unemployment spell squared 
-.003 
(.0002) 
-.0000 
(.0002) 
-.0004
* 
(.0002) 
-.0004
* 
(.0002) 
.0001 
(.0002) 
-.0003 
(.0003) 
R-squared  .0996  4276  .3441  .1058  .4766  .3643 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  All regressions use the White estimator of variance.  The 
covariates are described in table 10. 
§ Dependent variable: col. 1 and 4 = log(current earnings/previous earnings); col. 2 and 5 = log (previous earnings 
deflated by GDP deflator); and col. 3 and 6 = log(current earnings deflated by GDP deflator) 
*         Estimate significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence level 
**  Estimate significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level 
***  Estimate significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 21. Number of layoffs and plant closings reported in a given year  
using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Workers re-employed at survey date 
Survey Year  Year of Displacement  Cause of Displacement 
    Layoffs  Plant closings 
1988 
 
1990 
 
1987 
149 
 
100 
131 
 
148 
1990 
 
1992 
 
1989 
146 
 
114 
103 
 
157 
1996 
 
1998 
 
1995 
185 
 
92 
103 
 
81 
1998 
 
2000 
 
1997 
163 
 
86 
95 
 
79 
 
 
Table 22. Average pre-displacement tenure reported for a given year 
by cause of displacement using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Workers re-employed at survey date 
  Year of Displacement Cause of Displacement 
Survey Year    Layoffs  Plant closings 
1988 
 
1990 
 
1987 
3.6 
 
4.5 
5.6 
 
4.5 
1990 
 
1992 
 
1989 
2.5 
 
4.4 
4.2 
 
5.4 
1996 
 
1998 
 
1995 
3.5 
 
5.2 
5.1 
 
4.8 
1998 
 
2000 
 
1997 
3.9 
 
5.5 
5.4 
 
6.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 23. Post-displacement earnings equation using the DWS (1988-2000) 
Males re-employed at survey date 
  Dependent variable: Post-displacement weekly earnings 
 § 
  Whole sample 
N = 4,450 
Displaced within the last two years 
N = 3,114 
Unemployment spell  -.017
*** 
(.004) 
-.024
*** 
(.005) 
Unemployment spell 
 Squared 
.0004
*** 
(.0001) 
.0006
*** 
(.0002) 
Layoff Dummy   -.036 
(.022) 
-.067
** 
(.027) 
Layoff dummy  
x Unemployment spell 
.010
** 
(.005) 
.019
*** 
(.006) 
Layoff dummy  
x Unemployment spell  
squared 
-.0004
** 
(.0002) 
-.0006
*** 
(.0002) 
R-squared  .5036  .5127 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  All regressions use the White estimator of variance.  In addition to the variables 
shown in the table, the covariates are: log (previous earnings deflated by GDP deflator); a spline function in previous tenure (with 
breaks at 1, 2, 3, and 6 years); eleven dummies for completed education (one for “one to four years”; one for “five to six years”; one 
for “seven to eight years”; one for “nine years”; one for “ten years”; one for “eleven years”; one for “twelve years”; one for “thirteen 
years”; one for “fourteen and fifteen years”; one for “sixteen years”; one for “seventeen years”); fourteen “year-of-displacement” 
dummies; five “year of survey” dummies; one “years since displacement” dummy; one “advance notification” dummy; ten “previous-
industry” dummies; five “previous-occupation” dummies; one “experience at displacement” variable and its square; one “pre-
displacement marital status” dummy; one “non-white” dummy; one “survey pre-1994” dummy; three “region” dummies; and “state” 
dummies.    
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